

# The Academy of Political Science

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are, the author is hard pressed to explain why they are so influential. He neglects to explore an obvious answer: the legitimation their ideas provide for weapons contracts. That space warrior think tanks such as the Center for Security Policy are bankrolled largely by aerospace and defense contractors is evidence of this. (See William Hartung, "About Face: The Role of the Arms Lobby in the Bush Administration's Radical Reversal of Two Decades of U.S. Nuclear Policy," World Policy Institute Special Report, May 2002, <http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/reportAboutFace.html>).

While overlooking this immediate nexus between ideology and special interests, Moore aims to understand the space warriors in a broader ideological context. He attributes to "American exceptionalism" their belief that U.S. dominance of space serves all of humanity. Exemplified by the multilateralist Woodrow Wilson, as well as the unilateralist Ronald Reagan, exceptionalists see a messianic role for the United States in world history. But Moore's analysis breaks down here, because unilateralism is fundamental to space warrior ideology, while multilateralism is fundamental to its antithesis—the PAROS agenda. Since "American exceptionalism" takes both forms, how can it help explain space warrior ideology? American militarism, instead, may be the broad construct Moore should have explored.

Notwithstanding these limitations, Mike Moore's book is timely, learned, and important. The future of space is currently being decided in corporate boardrooms and Pentagon offices, with the quiet complicity of Congress. *Twilight War*—which is a page-turner—launches the informed debate on U.S. space policy that democracy requires.

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**Winners Without Losers: Why Americans Should Care More About Global Economic Policy** by Edward J. Lincoln. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2007. 267 pp. \$27.95.

I hope that this book will be widely read by policymakers and opinion leaders, as well as by academics and students. Its central message could hardly be more important. Edward Lincoln convincingly argues that "we are currently in danger of making our world less safe by ignoring or downplaying economic issues" (p. 1). "Far too often U.S. security policy and economic policy proceed on completely separate tracks" (p. 226).

Of course, a number of popular books have sounded this alarm, but Lincoln finds works such as Thomas Friedman's *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* too "anecdotal and enthusiastic" and "jarring to anyone who cares about statistical evidence" (p. 12). Lincoln sets himself the task of providing such an appropriate background and does an excellent job. While not as gifted a writer as Friedman, Lincoln keeps his intended broad audience in mind and presents a good case that "reality is quite exciting even without the hype" (p. 12). While judicious

in presenting and evaluating evidence, Lincoln does not shy away from offering strong judgments on particular views. For example, he labels as “absurd” the idea that China will inevitably be an enemy of the United States.

Throughout the book, he contrasts three major views of international relations: realism, liberalism, and neoconservatism. It is not surprising that Lincoln, as a card-carrying and quite highly respected economist, goes down squarely in favor of the liberal view. His version, however, is much more nuanced and sophisticated than the highly simplified version sometimes advocated by the right and critiqued by the left. His analysis of issues such as energy security and foreign aid should be of considerable value to individuals coming from almost any perspective.

Lincoln argues that today’s world is far different from the imperialist past and that economic interests and growing interdependence provide powerful incentives for a more peaceful world. He warns, however, that liberals need to understand that other considerations sometimes prevail over economic interests. He recognizes the imperfections of global economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, but he sees them as beneficial and provides a number of sensible suggestions for improvements.

He offers valuable perspectives on developments in the United States, Europe, and Asia and on how globalization has influenced them. Such coverage can make the book quite valuable for use in classes in comparative and international political economy and globalization as well as courses in international relations and foreign policy.

My major criticism of the book is its title, *Winners Without Losers*. This can easily give the impression that Lincoln’s book is just another example of naïve free market enthusiasm that ignores the realities of distributional conflict. This is far from the case, however. Contrary to charges sometimes leveled against it, international trade theory does not conclude that everyone gains from trade. What it shows is that there are generally net gains; that is, that trade is a positive sum game, not that no one is hurt. Lincoln is well aware of this and offers a useful discussion of ways to ease the burdens on those who lose from trade. He is quite clear that to function well, a market system needs support from government. What Lincoln has served up is clear thinking, not a batch of free market ideology. One need not agree with all of his policy recommendations to benefit greatly from his analysis.

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**Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia**  
*by P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2007. 252 pp. Cloth, \$59.95; paper, \$24.95.*

The enduring conflict relationship between India and Pakistan has generated a number of scholarly and general works in recent years. Some of these reflect