

The Academy of Political Science

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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Volume 124 · Number 4 · Winter 2009-10

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Political Science Quarterly

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to be loved by the media. In his own way, he struggles to do what he thinks is right. But his hand-wringing neither reveals nor is guided by any clear, coherent, or consistent principles on constitutional law. His jurisprudence consists largely of ad hoc value judgments that are not in any clear way rooted in the Constitution.

A critical element of Knowles's re-creation of Justice Kennedy is her conclusion, expressed in her title, that for Kennedy, "The Tie Goes to Freedom." Defining "freedom" in the way Knowles seems to do, Kennedy is much preferable to some of his brethren, most notably Justices Alito, Roberts, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, whose own constitutional methodologies of "originalism" and "strict constructionism" are even less likely than Kennedy's jurisprudence of hand-wringing to side with "freedom." But this hardly commends Kennedy's decision making, either substantively or methodologically. Anthony Kennedy is the "man in the middle" not because he is wise or thoughtful or principled, but because he serves on an extraordinarily conservative Court. It is only against that backdrop that it makes any sense to say that for Kennedy, "The Tie Goes to Freedom."

Having said all this, I want to add a few important words of praise for Knowles. Although she does not persuade me of her main thesis—that Anthony Kennedy is a "highly principled jurist," she does offer an insightful and careful analysis of his opinions in important areas of constitutional law. Moreover, in her analysis of those opinions, she does uncover some themes that help explain Kennedy's outcomes. And because Kennedy does, in fact, remain the "man in the middle," it is essential for those of us who care about constitutional law to understand his thinking, whatever it might be.

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The Opinion Makers: An Insider Exposes the Truth Behind the Polls
by David W. Moore. Boston, MA, Beacon Press, 2008. 196 pp. \$23.95.

In this highly engaging book, the "truth" that David W. Moore exposes is that the news media have a vested interest in perpetuating the notion of an intelligent or rational public, as revealed by responses to individual questions in the polls the media sponsor. This justifies the opinion polling they do as an increasing part of the news as "pseudo events" that they can create and use to attract audiences. The media are *The Opinion Makers* who "manufacture" public opinion: the responses to poll questions about policy issues that they report are much of the time illusory, in that the public often has little relevant knowledge or information on which to base its responses (though Moore provides no estimate of the prevalence of this). Moreover, the questions are typically "forced choices"; respondents are usually given little opportunity to say that they are not sufficiently informed to offer an opinion. And a sure sign of the meaninglessness of

their responses is that they can vary greatly depending on the question wording, including any kind of information they are “fed” by the pollsters. That said, in treating these misleading responses as an important input into the political process, the media do great damage to American democracy.

This critique echoes George Bishop’s *The Illusion of Public Opinion*, but Moore’s further contribution comes from his insights as an insider working at the Gallup Poll in its media partnerships, and from his examples from 13 polling organizations (p. xvi). There is also an excellent chapter on polling’s “Uncertain Future”—given declining response rates, the penetration of cell phones, and efforts to do Internet polling. While Moore is particularly harsh on polling during the highly volatile 2008 presidential primary elections, he was ahead of other experts (American Association for Public Opinion Research, “An Evaluation of the Methodology of the 2008 Pre-Election Primary Polls,” March 2009) in concluding that the media miscalled the crucial Democratic primary in New Hampshire, in part because polling stopped too early to catch late shifts. However, in criticizing how the media reported on the irrelevant *national* polls during the *state* primaries in making Rudolph Giuliani and Hillary Clinton the early front-runners, he overlooked their early leads in the largest states.

Contrary to George Gallup’s idealized expectations during the early days of scientific surveys, that polling would be good for democracy by allowing the voice of the people to be heard, Moore observes how media polling gave the false impression that a majority of the public supported going to war against Iraq in 2003. He argues that there was no basis for such a claim because a plurality of survey respondents, when asked in a February 2003 poll, did not care if the government did the opposite of what they supported concerning the war. At most, there was an indication that public opinion was “permissive” on the issue. Moore cites other such examples (opposition to closing the prison in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba and support for an anti-missile defense system) to show how the polls—and especially media reporting of them—misled the nation, as they were used to justify particular policies in the name of democracy.

There are limitations, however, to these claims. First, there is no clear evidence that the public’s opinions that the media reported affected policymaking as Moore’s discussion implies. What did affect policy was the lack of sufficient opposition toward going to war in Iraq among Democrats in Congress, which stemmed largely from the George W. Bush administration’s manipulation of information about the threat Iraq posed in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Second, Moore is correct that when it comes to important policy issues, news media reports focus on responses to questions asked in the latest polls—specifically majority support for a particular policy. This is the simple “referendum model” in interpreting the polls. In Moore’s view, this reporting needs to dig more deeply into the extent to which opinions are informed and intensely held (what Gallup began doing but what he and later pollsters found inconvenient and costly). But Moore does not go sufficiently beyond the referendum model. He does not acknowledge how the

effects of variations in question wording can reveal substantive information about public opinion. He is silent on how the close scrutiny of longitudinal data and more-sophisticated analyses have led to more-positive conclusions in academic research about a “responsible electorate,” “a reasoning voter,” or a “prudent public.” While this research too has its limitations, it suggests an alternative interpretation of the Iraq war case: trend data over many months showed persistent majority support that remained overwhelming when the Iraq invasion began. The public was more than permissive—it was *predisposed* toward war in a way that was not necessarily wise, but *explicable* given the information available.

While Moore’s critique of media reporting of polls rings true, what a cursory reader of his book might conclude about the overall nature of American public opinion does not. But if public opinion analysts in the media take care in comparing multiple measures of opinion, track opinion measures over time, understand—as Moore emphasizes—when an issue has become salient enough for the public to have real opinions instead of “non-attitudes,” and compare the public’s opinions on different issues, there would be less need for debate about whether public opinion warrants serious attention in the political process in between elections.

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Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy by Steven Metz. Dulles, VA, Potomac Books, 2008. 288 pp. \$29.95.

The Iraq war threw a wrench into many theories of international politics. The years since have spawned a veritable cottage industry in search of explanations for why the United States invaded Iraq, why it spurned international institutions, and whether the post-war mayhem was a foregone conclusion. Steven Metz’s book, *Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy*, contributes to that industry. Unlike most, however, his is a balanced and non-polemical account of the decade-long march to war. He achieves this uncommon feat by situating the war in a broader set of questions about American strategy, with the goal of drawing out strategic lessons, presumably for future wars.

“This book is about strategy,” the book begins (p.xvii). In fact, it is really about the peculiarities of American strategic culture: impatient, Manichean, pragmatic, technology-reliant, uneasy with its tension between power and ideals, with a propensity for retrenchment during peacetime and the tendency to “mirror image” other cultures and to assume that they operate in the same way as American society does. In this veritable grab-bag of attributes lie the causes of America’s ill-fated Iraq strategy.

Metz makes a convincing case that the peculiarities of American strategic culture have made certain outcomes more likely. American strategic culture explains why Saddam Hussein was easy to vilify for the purposes of public mobilization in 1990–91 and 2003. Continuity of strategic culture explains