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adjust their positions so all can gain. Through participation in multilateral negotiation frameworks, developing countries found more options and were able to exert greater influence on the outcomes than they had thought possible. The book provides a list of negotiation tactics and explains how they have been used by various players. Along the way, developing countries also discovered comparative advantages that enable them to participate more effectively in the global economy.

Another conclusion is that international negotiations can be as much about cooperation in solving problems as they are about strategic posturing. This is especially the case when dealing with highly technical matters, such as in telecommunications and banking, on which specialists from various parties can come together on a common ground of expertise.

The book is about negotiation. The information economy provides the empirical basis for developing propositions of broad validity in the context of political science. Yet also practitioners in the information economy, such as information and communication policymakers and regulators, will gain valuable insights from the description of cases and discussion of interdependent factors shaping the outcomes. These insights may help sectoral practitioners work more effectively with their trade counterparts that conduct the countries' participation in international negotiations. This is especially timely as leading countries again have committed to bringing the Doha round of the WTO to successful closure.

But this is not primarily a book on the political science of the information economy. Sectoral practitioners will need to comb the book cover to cover to extract their own conclusions. These are not pulled together in a concise manner that would facilitate practical application. Greater economy of language, and less use of terminology that may be familiar to political scientists but not to sector specialists or the public at large, would also have been helpful. But the added understanding to be gained is well worth the effort.

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Pacific Alliance: Reviving U.S.–Japan Relations by *Kent E. Calder*.
New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2009. 312 pp. \$40.00.

Kent Calder is a political scientist who has written many valuable studies of Japanese politics. He also served for four years (1997–2001) as an adviser to the American ambassador in the Tokyo embassy. He writes this book perhaps less as a scholar than as an unabashed advocate of the United States–Japan alliance, which he describes as “sacrosanct” (p. 1) and of “transcendent importance” (p. 29). My “ultimate purpose,” he says, “has been to strengthen and deepen a U.S.-Japan partnership that [former ambassador] Mike Mansfield justly called ‘the most important relationship in the world, bar none’” (p. 216).

He writes with a sense of urgency because the alliance is facing a “quiet crisis.” Its pillars are “eroding” in a way that is “potentially disastrous” (p. 112),

and “the challenge is nothing less than achieving a renaissance of the Pacific Alliance” (p. 178). The two nations must address this challenge, and, he concludes, “They must not fail” (p. 238).

Calder looks back with nostalgia to the end of the Occupation era when John Foster Dulles crafted the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 and brought Japan into an alliance that provided long-term bases for the United States in Japan and sheltered Japan while allowing it to rebuild its economy through privileged access to the American market and technology. This “security for economics” bargain that was at the heart of the alliance was underwritten by a panoply of cultural institutions and personal networks that Dulles, John D. Rockefeller III, Edwin Reischauer, and others of that generation forged in Japan. The “house that Dulles built” garnered political, military, economic, and cultural “equities” that functioned smoothly and served the interests of both nations in the Cold War. If the alliance had a weakness, it was that it was too much grounded in “elite networks” and lacked broad public appreciation in Japan of its benefits.

The author argues that since the end of the Cold War, however, globalization, the shift in trade patterns, and the rise of China have undermined the bilateral relationship. New institutions, especially the World Trade Organization, have provided alternative venues for dealing with economic issues that were once worked out in bilateral negotiations. Further, Japanese and American trade with China has dramatically outpaced the trade between these allies. Foreign direct investment in Japan remains paltry, while China has attracted large-scale U.S. investment. China’s rise has overshadowed Japan’s importance to American interests and has left the Japanese with fewer defenders in Washington. In Japan, despite some increased technical cooperation in ballistic missile defense and an ambitious Pentagon effort to realign forces to “make Japan a frontline American command post for the Asia-Pacific region and even beyond” (p. 148), support for the alliance remains equivocal, owing to unresolved constitutional issues, popular ambivalence, and political gridlock.

Calder concludes with prescriptions for reviving the alliance that stress tighter military integration, a more open Japanese economy, and establishing new personal networks. The book is valuable for its explanation of how American policymakers view the urgent needs of the alliance. There is, however, relatively little treatment of why many Japanese have viewed the alliance with ambivalent feelings. While observing that the Japanese public does not have a consensus on defining the nation’s security, the book does not explore the thinking in Japan that inhibits the Japanese from a more forthright embrace of the alliance. In an alliance that is as asymmetrical as this one, it may be inevitable that the dominant partner pays scant attention to the views of the other. But a full account of the relationship and how it might be improved should nonetheless explain how the junior partner views the alliance.

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