TERRORIST ATTACKS AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: STRATEGIES FOR OVERLAPPING DANGERS Demetrios James Caraley Loren Morales Kando Editors 2007 · $27.50 (APS Members: $22.00) ISBN13: 978-1-884853-06-7 · ISBN10: 1-884853-06-4 Yours FREE when you subscribe to Political Science Quarterly.

Terrorist Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation: Strategies for Overlapping Dangers examines strategies to combat terrorism and counter nuclear proliferation, and discusses related moral, ethical, and constitutional consequences.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY (Barnard College and Columbia University) writes:

This book is a sequel to two volumes previously published by the Academy of Political Science: September 11, Terrorist Attacks, and U.S. Foreign Policy and American Hegemony: Preventive War, Iraq, and Imposing Democracy. The purpose of this latest book is to bring within one volume essays that examine the continued threat of terrorist attacks, the proliferation of nuclear capacity, and, worst of all, the possibility of a nuclear weapon coming into the hands of and being used by these terrorists. In this kind of scenario, terrorists could kill not just 3,000 but 30,000, or even 300,000 Americans in a matter of hours. There are also chapters that look at the ethical, moral, and constitutional repercussions that have come from fighting these threats.

WALTER LAFEBER (Cornell University) writes:

As this volume’s essays demonstrate, the onrushing debate over the post-9/11 course of U.S. foreign policy involves historic questions: whether Americans can adjust their policies to deal with new types of terrorism, whether they can at the same time control and make presidential power openly responsible, and whether they can revive the badly wounded system of alliances that helped win the Cold War and is essential for dealing with transnational terrorism. It also involves the question of whether Americans can accomplish these objectives while creating a more equitable, democratic system at home.

ROBERT JERVIS (Columbia University) argues that despite some successes, the Bush Doctrine cannot be sustained because it has many internal contradictions, requires more sustained domestic support than is possible, makes excessive demands on intelligence, places too much faith in democracy, and is overly ambitious. It will, however, be difficult to construct a replacement foreign policy.

QUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ and KARL KALTENTHALER (University of Akron) focus on how spiritual incentives inspire Islamic radicalism. They argue that radical Islamic groups offer spiritual incentives and strategies for fulfilling divine duties and maximizing the prospect of salvation on judgment day. They conclude that the choice of individuals to move to high-cost and high-risk activism can be understood as a rational decision.

DAVID P. AUERSWALD (National War College) assesses whether deterrence policies can prevent a WMD attack by nonstate actors. He argues that deterrence may not preclude terrorist attacks, but that deterrence threats can greatly impede trafficking in WMD and related materials, preventing terrorists from getting these weapons in the first place.

ANNE L. CLUNAN (Naval Postgraduate School) examines the prospects for an international regime to combat terrorist financing. She concludes that in the absence of a common definition among the United States and its European allies, the prospects for implementing a vigorous counter-terrorist-financing regime are dim.

ANDREW FLIBBERT (Trinity College) explores the weapons proliferation pressures that have long confronted Iraq. He argues that the logic of the security dilemma may one day lead Baghdad to renew its efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Democratization, responsible leadership, or a continued American military presence are unlikely to eliminate Iraq’s quest for the deadliest weapons in a dangerous regional environment.

VICTOR D. CHA (Georgetown University) and DAVID C. KANG (Dartmouth College) debate the strengths and weaknesses of an engagement policy to rid North Korea of its nuclear weapons program. From different perspectives, the two authors analyze common misconceptions about North Korean intentions and strategies as well as debate the merits of a harder-line approach taken by the United States toward the reclusive regime. Whether one views Pyongyang’s intentions with greater skepticism (Cha) or greater flexibility (Kang), the authors argue that some form of engagement, not military preemption, is advisable.

JIM WALSH (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) examines the nature of Tehran's nuclear ambitions and nuclear decision making, U.S. policy options and their likely effects, and the consequences of an Iranian nuclear weapon.

MICHAEL L. GROSS (University of Haifa) examines the arguments that Palestinians and Israelis offer when innocent lives are taken. He challenges claims that existential threats (supreme emergency) or reprisals for past wrongs can justify terror attacks on noncombatants. At the same time, he objects to explanations that invoke the doctrine of double effect and claim that noncombatants are not killed intentionally but die as an unintended side effect of necessary military operations.

JEROME SLATER (State University of New York at Buffalo) argues that in certain circumstances in the war on terrorism, the coercion or perhaps even the torture of captured terrorists may be both necessary for national security and morally a lesser evil than the preventable mass murder of innocents.

MICHAEL C. DORF (Columbia University School of Law) describes the interactions among the three branches of the federal government in addressing the detention and trial of captives in the war in Afghanistan and the broader ‘‘war on terror.’’ He explains that the Supreme Court’s repeated rejections of the Bush administration’s sweeping assertions of wartime authority have erected few insurmountable obstacles to administration policy. Instead, the Court has required the administration to seek authority from Congress, which in turn has shown little appetite for reining in the President.

DANIEL BYMAN (Georgetown University) challenges the view that proliferation and terrorism are similar problems and that the policies to combat them necessarily operate in harmony. Policymakers concerned about nuclear terrorism should focus on helping potential leakers improve security and on guarding against the rise of hostile ideological states.