What in the Name of God is Strategic Superiority?
BARRY BLECHMAN and Robert Powell examine the nuclear warnings issued by the Eisenhower administration as part of its strategy to end the Korean War and conclude that the actual effect of these warnings is uncertain. They also stress that strategic balance in the 1980s is so fundamentally different from the balance of nuclear forces in 1953 that no valid lessons for contemporary problems may be drawn from this incident.
Congress and the Cold War, Robert David Johnson Reviewed by Barry M. Blechman
Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Reviewed by Barry M. Blechman
How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam, Gil Merom Reviewed by Barry M. Blechman
Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict, Patrick M. Regan Reviewed by Barry M. Blechman
Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy, Barry M. Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittesmore by this author
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North Korea and the West
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CONTINUING ISSUES IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
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