The Case for Identity Politics: Polarization, Demographic Change and Racial Appeals

Welcome
IRA KATZNELSON

Keynote
CHRISTOPHER T. STOUT

Response
FREDRICK C. HARRIS

Moderator
ESTER R. FUCHS

THE DONA AND CAROL HAMILTON DISTINGUISHED LECTURE held on 13 October 2020 featured Christopher Stout and his book entitled, *The Case for Identity Politics: Polarization, Demographic Change and Racial Appeals* (University of Virginia Press, 2020). This virtual event was co-sponsored by the Department of Political Science at Columbia University, the Urban and Social Policy Program at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs, the African American and African Diaspora Studies Department at Columbia University, and The Academy of Political Science. The Dona and Carol Hamilton Distinguished Lecture Series was established by Charles Hamilton, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, as an annual event hosted at the School of International and Public Affairs by the Department of Political Science to honor the life and work of his late wife, Dona, and daughter, Carol.

Following the defeat of Hillary Clinton in 2016, many prominent scholars and political pundits argued that the Democratic Party must abandon identity politics. While calls for Democrats to distance themselves from racial/ethnic politics receive a lot of attention, there is little academic work empirically testing whether non-racial campaigns provide an advantage to Democrats in the current political climate. Dr. Stout's book, *The Case for Identity Politics*, explores how the current racial and political context, political polarization, and demographic change make racial appeals an effective form of political outreach for the Democratic Party.

IRA KATZNELSON[1]**:** Good afternoon. It is a deep personal privilege for me to introduce the third Dona and Carol Hamilton distinguished annual lecturer. The series was created by our dear colleague and friend Charles Hamilton. The first two lecturers were Stanley Greenberg, who as a notable pollster and political scientist at Yale wrote a wonderful book on race and state in South Africa in comparative perspective, and Rosa DeLauro, who has been representing the third district for Connecticut in Congress since 1991.

Allow me to say a word or two about Carol and Dona Hamilton, both of whom I was privileged to know. Carol was serving as press secretary to Commerce Secretary Ronald Brown at the time of her tragic death in April 1996 in a plane crash outside of Dubrovnik, Croatia—a crash

[1] **IRA KATZNELSON** is Columbia University's Interim Provost, Ruggles Professor of Political Science and History, and Deputy Director, Columbia World Projects.

that also killed Secretary Brown and four other senior staff members. Carol was a woman of great ability, character, and warmth.

Dona, Charles Hamilton's personal partner and a person of great intellect and grace, earned her doctorate at Columbia in the School of Social Work. Her book with Charles, *The Dual Agenda: Race and Social Welfare Policies of Civil Rights Organizations*, was grounded in her path-breaking dissertation that demonstrated how the agenda of the American civil rights movement was never exclusively one of political and civil rights, but also was one of social and economic rights.

Finally, before I turn the session over to my dear colleague and friend, Ester Fuchs, a word about Charles Hamilton who of course needs absolutely no introduction—a matter of having the opportunity to repay a personal debt. He arrived at Columbia in the Department of Political Science in the fall of 1969. I arrived as a young assistant professor the same year. I was asked on my arrival by the chair of the department, the late Wayne Wilcox, if I would be willing to co-teach a course with Charles Hamilton on race in the United States. The possibility to have such a class had been a demand of our graduate students after the 1968 campus uprising. Of course, I was thrilled to say yes, but also terrified. Charles Hamilton had just published *Black Power* with Stokely Carmichael. He was a major figure in American life—an accomplished person with a background in law and political science. I was entering my first job. With his characteristic human grace, Professor Hamilton treated me as if I belonged.

I learned more from Professor Hamilton in the time we talked together than I think I've learned from anyone else in as concentrated a period. It was a period where I first learned to think about institutional racism, a term he and Stokely Carmichael coined in their book. It was the first time I had ever had conversations in a sustained way with an African American friend and colleague about the meaning and character of racism in America. That was a transformative experience for me, and I am forever grateful that this man of quiet courage, great humor, brilliant teaching, and humane sensibility was willing to put up with his then quite ignorant junior colleague.

Ester Fuchs, who will now moderate and help lead this session, is Professor of International and Public Affairs and Political Science. She is a leader in our faculty—a person who connects thinking and doing in a quite profound and effective way. As I turn these proceedings over to her, I also want to thank Wilmot James for his leadership in making this event happen. Wilmot is a dear friend of Charles Hamilton. Charles' connections to South Africa, Wilmot's home, have been quite remarkable ever since Charles Hamilton first visited South Africa more than 40 years ago. On to Ester and on to this felicitous event.

ESTER R. FUCHS[2]**:** Thank you, Ira. It's always my great pleasure to be on a panel with Ira Katznelson, a giant in our field who wrote about race and American politics—especially race in American cities, before the academy, especially political science, thought it was anything important to write about. Just a personal thank you, Ira. Your leadership at Columbia has been extraordinary during this really difficult moment. We thank you for taking the time to be part of this lecture today. Thank you, Wilmot. This is a wonderful thing we have each year to celebrate the life of two extraordinary people and to honor our wonderful colleague, Chuck Hamilton.

Just a point of personal privilege before we continue with the serious topic we have before us today. During the first lecture, Chuck was able to be with us. I had a paperback copy of *Black Power* that I had bought as a graduate student. I ran to my office so I could bring it up to Chuck

[2] **ESTER R. FUCHS** is Professor of International and Public Affairs and Political Science and Director of the Urban and Social Policy Program at Columbia University SIPA.

to show him that I had had this book before I knew him. He took it from me and signed it. And he said to me, "Now you can sell it on eBay for a lot of money." And I thought, how we love you because you always knew how to make us feel comfortable—not just educate us, but bring us into your world. I hope that you get to hear this today because I think we're going to have a really wonderful afternoon.

I do want to quickly thank all the sponsors of our event today: the Department of Political Science who hosts this event every year, SIPA's Urban and Social Policy program, and the African-American and African Diaspora Studies program here at Columbia. And of course, The Academy of Political Science and our colleague, Bob Shapiro, and all the wonderful staff at the Academy who have made this happen, especially Loren Kando, who we work very closely with.

This is a perfect topic for our politics today. Before I introduce our guest speakers, I just want to say thank you to Chris for writing this extraordinary book. Chris, thanks so much for being with us and for writing this book. For those of us who have studied identity politics, or maybe even just experienced it ourselves, we all know it has a double edge meaning to it. Sometimes it can be viewed favorably as a way of bringing us together—the gorgeous mosaic, as our former mayor, David Dinkins, used to call New York City. We could all have our identities in political life, but ultimately we have a lot in common. Then of course, there's the use of identity politics to divide us. This is a moment in which we have to grapple with the concept of identity in American politics, both on the national scene, as well as in our state and local politics. I feel strongly that we're going to learn a lot today about how to think about this concept, and whether or not it can still be used in a nonideological way to help us understand how politics actually works, as opposed to a way in which it is often employed—deeply ideological and deeply divisive.

I'd first like to introduce Chris Stout. Chris is an associate professor at the School of Public Policy at Oregon State University, and his research interests include racial and ethnic politics, gender and politics, political behavior, and representation in Congress. He has also written, *Bringing Race Back In: Black Politicians, Deracialization, and Voting Behavior in the Age of Obama*. He will be our keynote. Then Fredrick Harris will be commenting afterwards, as well as Ira and Wilmot, as they see fit.

I know everybody in the Columbia community knows Fred Harris and his work. He's been currently, like Ira, called to duty in the president's office. He's Dean of Social Science, as well as Professor of Political Science, and he also serves as the Director of the Center on African American Politics and Society here at Columbia. His research interests have been primarily in American politics with a focus on race and politics, political participation, social movements, and African American politics. His most recent books are *The Price of the Ticket: Barack Obama and the Rise and Decline of Black Politics*, and with Robert Lieberman, *Beyond Discrimination: Racial Inequality in a Post-Racist Era*. He's also the author of *Something Within: Religion in African-American Political Activism*, which was awarded the V.O. Key Award by the Southern Political Science Association. We're so glad you could join us today, Fred. I know you and Ira both have a lot on your plate right now. I know having you here will add significantly to the discussion. It's a personal delight to have you here, Fred.

Ira needs no introduction. We all know his work, but I will say he has written at least 10 or 15 books already. He's co-authored several books, and he's edited volumes. Everybody knows him now as the Interim Provost. He's also the Ruggles Professor of Political Science and History, and Deputy Director of Columbia World Projects. One of his books that really affected me a lot recently is *Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time*. This book won the Bancroft Prize. It's a very important book. One of the reasons I became a political scientist was Ira Katznelson's *Black Men, White Cities*. You were so ahead of your time in thinking about this issue. It's a really prescient book telling us so much about things that are happening right now

before our very eyes. It's my pleasure now to give the floor over to our keynote speaker, Christopher Stout. I think this is going to be an exciting presentation.

CHRISTOPHER T. STOUT[3]**:** Thank you so much. Let me begin by saying it's such an honor to be speaking here today. I want to thank Professor Harris, Professor Katznelson, and Professor Fuchs for being here. All of your work has been inspirational in my career. I also want to thank Professor James for inviting me to speak today. One of the reasons this means so much to me is that the work of Professor Hamilton has really shaped my career. It has for a lot of young black political scientists. As I'll talk about in a second, it's rare for political scientists like Hamilton to have such a large impact not only in political science, but also on real world politics. I can't express enough gratitude for this opportunity and for being mentioned in the same breath as Professor Hamilton.

After Democrats faced a set of consecutive defeats in 1968 and 1972—and this shows how important Professor Hamilton was—the Democratic Party went to speak with Professor Hamilton to help craft a strategy around racial politics going forward. Hamilton, studying the conditions very carefully, noted that the Republican Party had been using the Democratic Party's use of targeted racial messaging to turn off white voters. This led them to lose a significant amount of support at the polls. Hamilton, who was always interested in racial equality and racial justice, argued that the best way to advance black political interests, would be for the Democratic Party to focus on issues which universally helped people in poverty, including universal employment programs and universal healthcare. These types of programs would be accepted by the general population and would also help blacks, who were disproportionately in poverty. However, targeted racial programs like busing and affirmative action would turn off some white voters and make it so Democrats couldn't be elected.

This strategy, where candidates talk about non-racial liberal policies, has been coined a deracialized strategy. The goal of the deracialized strategy is to advance black political interests while focusing on non-racial issues. The deracialization hypothesis had an immediate and substantial effect on American politics. Jimmy Carter used it to succeed in the 1976 election, and Bill Clinton used it in the 1990 election. And looking beyond white politicians, it expanded where African American elected officials were elected. This is best exemplified with the Black Tuesday candidates, who on 7 November 1989 were elected in numerous white majority cities, including Seattle and others. It was also on this day when L. Douglas Wilder was elected to the governorship of Virginia and became the first black governor of any state. All of these candidates used Hamilton's framework for deracialization. Of course, the deracialization framework was most famously used by Barack Obama in his 2008 presidential campaign. Beyond its impact on politics, you can imagine that a strategy this important led to a generation of scholars trying to understand when and where deracialization is most effective, and whether or not it's always effective. My own research on this topic is discussed in my first book, *Bringing Race Back In*, in which I argue that African-American candidates can use racialized appeals in certain areas as long as they do so in a positive and constructive way.

I am honored today, and I was equally honored about four years ago in October 2016 when I was invited to a conference at Columbia University, Black Power at 50. It was at this conference where I first got to meet Dr. Hamilton, who is a superstar in the field. I was really excited for

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that opportunity. One of the things that we were tasked with at this conference was to think about our own work on deracialization and racialization, and to compare it to Dr. Hamilton's work. In this way, I found some conflict. I argued that a racialized appeal can be effective if done correctly. Hamilton, at least in the 1970s, argued that we shouldn't use this. So, I went back and I read Dr. Hamilton's work in the *First World Journal*, which laid the groundwork for my research. Hamilton argued that the deracialized strategy is not set in stone. It's something that needed to be updated over time. A quote of his that I pulled from *First World Journal* states:

> The deracialization document was addressed to a strategy applicable to the electoral politics in the presidential context of 1976. It is not a strategy to be pursued at all times, in all places. Whether it would (or should) apply in a local election with a majority black electorate remains to be calculated. How it should be applied in conjunction with protest and pressure-group politics remains to be calculated. But at all times calculated is the key.

When I read more about this, I thought: Hamilton talks about deracialization and he says it works in certain contexts, but it shouldn't always be applied. I think one of the things that we, the political scientists and practitioners, have done is take this work and assumed that the same pattern will work over time. We have not delved deeply enough into whether a campaign which focuses on progressive racial outreach can be effective as the contexts change. So, speaking in 2016, I had this expectation that things had changed, and I wrote a short chapter about that. Then I decided this is an important enough topic that I should write a book about it. The question I look at in this book, and the focus of this talk today, is: Are progressive racial appeals advantageous in the current political landscape? If we apply the Hamilton framework to the current context, would he argue for more racial outreach, more racial appeals, more discussion explicitly of race, and discussions of public policy?

To really answer this question, I began by looking at the context in 1976 which made the deracialization strategy so effective. I identified three key factors, although there's more that I discuss in the book. The first is the fear that white voters get turned off by racially targeted appeals. I think most Americans like the idea of equality of opportunity. After the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights Act, many Americans felt that they had done enough to address racial inequality in American politics. The expectation was that any other race targeted program would unfairly benefit blacks at the cost of whites. An example of this would be affirmative action after the 1964 Civil Rights Act. There's an expectation that things were equal, policies had been set. So why would you give African Americans an advantage over whites? White voters, not universally, but close to universally, rejected affirmative action type policies. In this case, anytime politicians talk about targeted racial appeals, they're going to turn off white voters. In most settings in the United States, you can't win elections without bringing in at least some white support.

The second reason why deracialization was so effective during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s is that there was a large segment of the population who would swing between one party and another party depending on the presidential election. Elections were largely decided by where the swing voters sat. These swing voters weren't any random set of voters—they had a typical profile. They tended to be white working-class voters who were economically liberal but racially conservative. They liked the Democratic Party's platform on economic issues, but disliked the party's platform on racial issues. Given that, it makes sense for the Democratic Party to appeal to these voters and talk about the issues they agree with, like raising the minimum wage and strengthening unions. They would step away from issues that would turn off these voters, like affirmative action programs, busing, and things like this. It was important to get these voters because they were a wide swath of the population, and they swung between elections.

The third is a more recently discussed strength of the deracialization process or strategy. African Americans born after the civil rights movement, particularly Generation X and millennials, tended to be much more racially conservative. They tended to believe that they could assimilate with hard work and by adopting the norms of a white political culture. They too started to reject racialized candidates. There's a fantastic book by Charlton McIlwain and Stephen Caliendo. They show in experiments that African Americans, particularly young African Americans, supported deracialized candidates over racialized candidates. The voters you might appeal to by talking about racially progressive policies weren't joining those coalitions or supporting those candidates. There was no big benefit to talking about racially progressive policies.

I believe this starts to change, and others may disagree, in 2008. A couple of things happened in 2008 and beyond, which start to lead people to be more cognizant of racial discrimination in the United States. The first of course is the election of Barack Obama. Barack Obama represents the American dream to many people. He's someone who's raised by a single parent, went to Columbia for undergrad, Harvard for law school, and then became president of the United States. Many African Americans interviewed during this period said that if Barack Obama succeeds, this is an example that with hard work, anyone can succeed. This is particularly true amongst whites who hoped that Barack Obama's election ushered in an era of post-racial America, where race no longer mattered.

Even though people were hopeful after Barack Obama's election, these dreams were quickly dashed. Soon after his election, a social movement arose known as the Tea Party, which ostensibly was worried about growing deficits, but made numerous racially charged remarks to Obama. For example, many of the Tea Party charged that Obama wasn't born in the United States, that he was a Muslim. In dealing with members of the Tea Party, members of the Congressional Black Caucus said that racial epithets were yelled at them. All of this starts to raise concerns that maybe we weren't entering a post-racial society. Regardless the Tea Party's motivations, numerous public opinion polls show that a majority of Americans viewed them to be driven by racial animus rather than policy.

Now we start to see a growing recognition that we hadn't achieved what we hoped to achieve with the election of Barack Obama. We weren't in a post-racial society. This becomes further exacerbated with the shooting of Trayvon Martin in Florida, and the acquittal of a self-appointed nightwatchman, George Zimmerman. This sparks an online movement known as Black Lives Matter, started by three black women. This Black Lives Matter movement explodes in the summer of 2014, when Michael Brown is killed by police officer Darren Wilson in Ferguson, Missouri. After this happened, there's cascading events. People are seeing videos of African Americans being brutalized by law enforcement and vigilantes. This leads to a real awakening in the United States that we have not achieved a post-racial society. I think academics have long known that this wasn't the case. I think the public started to join in.

I want to note quickly that my data ends in 2016, but we see what happened over the summer in 2020 as furthering a lot of these issues. There is a Pew poll which shows that seven in 10 Americans discussed race or had conversations about race and racism after the killing of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor. The idea—that we could just blindly think that things had resolved and that race was no longer a problem—has been dashed in recent years.

After this growing racial reckoning, Americans become much more likely to believe that more needs to change in the United States to give blacks equal rights. Pew has several polls. I look at white voters and I disaggregate by whether or not they're liberal, moderate, or conservative. I look at the percentage who agree or strongly agree with the statement that more needs to change to give blacks equal rights in the United States. We can see in 2014—the poll was taken

before Michael Brown was killed in Ferguson, Missouri in 2015—that white liberals became about 16 percent more likely to believe that more needs to change to address racial inequality in the United States. I would guess that if we looked at this poll today, if there was data from 2020, we would see this growing further. A majority of white independents and white moderates also believe that more needs to change to give blacks equal rights. Even Republicans or liberal conservatives became more likely to agree with this statement over time. If you put all of these numbers together, close to 60 percent of Americans believe that more needed to change to give blacks equal rights.

Social scientists often use racial resentment to measure racial discrimination. Racial resentment measures covert racism or cultural racism. If you have high levels of racial resentment, you think African Americans are in the position that they're in because they don't work hard enough and not because of systematic barriers. I looked at this in 2016 for three different groups of whites: white Democrats, white independents, and white Republicans. Between the 2012 dataset and the 2016 dataset, there's a precipitous drop in the number of white Democrats' levels of racial resentment. White Democrats become much less likely to believe that African Americans are in the position they're in because of lack of hard work and more likely to believe that this is driven by systematic problems. This is also true, to a much lesser degree, for white political independents, who in 2016 scored lowest on this racial resentment measure. All of this adds up to this idea, or at least my argument, that some whites will be more supportive of racial outreach.

The American National Election Studies (ANES) asked individuals: If you yourself had to deal with racial inequality, what's the best way to deal with it? Do you think that, on one hand, blacks should help themselves, and that's going to lead to a change in racial equality? Or do you think you need more government policies to address racial inequality? In 2016, white Democrats became more supportive for the second time since this question was asked—that African Americans do need some racially progressive policies to address racial inequality. It's the largest in 2016 than it had ever been. It remains relatively steady for the other groups, although it declined significantly for Republicans during this period of time.

In sum, it does look like the first part of the argument—that deracialization will universally turn off white voters—might not be the case. Particularly, white Democrats might be mobilized by candidates who are making racial outreach in the current political context. The other argument that makes deracialization effective is that there are swing voters deciding elections, and this of course is true during this period of time. The Democratic Party had a real large problem electorally after the signing of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts. Before this, the New Deal coalition, one of the broadest coalitions of American politics, included strange bedfellows in Southern whites—who were universally opposed to progressive racial policies—and African Americans.

One good example of this would be Senator Richard Russell Jr. of Georgia, who in some ways epitomizes the extremes of the Reagan Democrats. He was someone who was a champion of the University of Georgia system, so he was a strong advocate for public education. He authored the National School Lunch Program, providing school lunches for children in poverty. At the same time that he advanced a progressive economic agenda, he also co-authored the Southern Manifesto, which argued that Southern states should ignore the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision. The Democrats faced real pressure of how to balance these twin concerns with these different groups. This is why the deracialization strategy I mentioned earlier was so effective.

What happens during the 2000s, and gets exacerbated in 2008, is that we enter a period of political polarization. People start to choose sides based off of the issues they select, and voters become less likely to swing. This makes it so that in general elections, people side with their

political parties: If I'm a Democrat, I vote for the Democratic Party, and if I'm a Republican, I vote with the Republican Party. In 2008, after Barack Obama is elected, this divide becomes exacerbated around views of race. Race becomes the dividing cleavage in American politics. This is outlined in Michael Tesler's book, *Post-Racial or Most-Racial*. If you view blacks, or Latinxs, or Asian Americans favorably, regardless of your class, you start to join the Democratic Party. And if you view these group negatively, regardless of your other opinions about American politics or your economic class, you start to join the Republican Party.

These two groups become more and more polarized over time. There's a feedback loop between racial progressives joining the Democratic Party and Democratic Party elites seeing these racial appeals. Its moves them further to the left on these issues. Republicans see that their base becomes racially conservative whites. They start to double down on racially conservative issues and there's a feedback loop which leads them to become more racially conservative. In this way, we end a period where there's a lot of swing voters. Swing voters largely decline around issues of race.

I use political scientist Larry Bartels' definition of who is a working-class person and an elite-class person. A working-class individual is someone in the lower third in income and only has a high school degree. Someone in the elite class is in the top third in terms of income in the United States and has at least a college degree. I further disaggregate these groups by whether or not they have high levels of racial resentment, and I take the median score. If you think African Americans are in the position that they're in because they haven't worked hard enough—and you believe yes, and more yes than no—then you go into the high racial resentment group. If you think that African Americans are in the position they're in because of systematic racism, then you go into the low treatment group. In the 1990s and early 2000s, there's not a big difference. Your class is really the dividing factor here. But as you move into 2008, and even more so into 2016, class becomes less of a divider. Your views on race become much more of a reason for polarization.

In the book, I also talk about vote choice and white working-class voters with low levels of racial resentment voting for the Democratic Party in 2016 at a rate of close to 85 percent, which is not dissimilar from African Americans. The other thing to note is that the real divide, again, is less about class. The larger differences are between whether or not you have high or low levels of racial resentment, rather than if you're working class or elite class. In this way, you see coalitions of working-class and elite-class voters coalescing around their opinions on race.

This changes how American campaigns are run starting in 2000 with Karl Rove's strategy for the George W. Bush campaign. It's less focused on swing voters—voters are largely decided on who they're going to support. What really changes elections is: Can you get your base enthusiastic about your candidate? Campaigns are won and lost on turnout. If this is the case, as Americans have become more divided by race and white Democrats become much more supportive of a racially progressive agenda, it's possible then that you can win elections by mobilizing white Democrats along with other groups. By discussing race, this can be a way to really mobilize that group.

Another thing to point out is that Hillary Clinton in 2016 lost, and there's been a lot of work discussing that the reason she lost wasn't simply because she lost a lot of swing voters—although there were some Obama-Trump voters. One of the main reasons she lost is that there were lower levels of turnout amongst her base, and that a lot of her base, or the Democratic Party's base, voted for third-party candidates. Wonderful work by Bernard Fraga and colleagues showed that had Hillary Clinton had the same black turnout as Barack Obama in 2008, she would've won Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and the White House. The loss in 2016, in part, was due to

lack of mobilization. This is not to minimize the fact that some voters did switch. Even with the switching, had mobilization and enthusiasm been higher for her campaign, she might've gone on to win.

For whites, I argue that there are some who are going to be much more supportive of a racially progressive agenda. I think the same thing is true for African Americans as well. As I mentioned, there's a lot of great work showing that the post-civil rights generation of African Americans tends to have lower levels of racial consciousness. Candis Watts Smith is someone who's done a lot of fantastic work in this area. For most of the 1990s and 2000s, there was discussion among blacks that they wanted a new politician. They wanted a politician, an African American politician like Barack Obama, who ran a deracialized campaign. Journalist Ellis Cose wrote a book, *The End of Anger*, and in it he interviews a lot of younger African Americans, and they talk about this—that the way to succeed in large part is to assimilate. If you assimilate and adopt the mainstream culture, then you can succeed. And they wanted their politicians to do similar things.

The Black Lives Matter movement and the Tea Party really changed blacks' perceptions of racial consciousness in American politics. The *New York Times* held a forum after the murder of Trayvon Martin in 2012 asking blacks how they felt. Many described this as a racial awakening. They said things like: Trayvon Martin is this generation's Emmett Till; if Emmett Till spurred the civil rights movement, then Trayvon Martin did the same thing for African Americans in 2012. Many said they had hoped Barack Obama was an example that we had gotten past race and racism, and that with hard work we can succeed. But, seeing what happened to Trayvon Martin and seeing how Obama was being treated by conservatives in the United States, led to a change in how they viewed their own position.

I looked to see whether there was a change in consciousness as a measure of linked fate. Linked fate is basically measured by a question which asks: How much do you think what happens to other African Americans in the United States has an impact on you? Numerous studies show that African Americans with higher levels of linked fate are much more likely to support racially progressive policies, and are much more likely to identify with the Democratic Party. An amazing change happens. This is measured by several national public opinion polls, but the starkest difference happens between the 2012 ANES and 2016 ANES, which shows a huge increase in blacks' attitudes about linked fate. Thus, whatever happens to other African Americans has a large impact on their own lives. Again, this might lead to a change in support for racially progressive candidates.

The other group I look at closely in this book is Latinxs. Latinxs tend to be more divided by national origin groups. So, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Mexican Americans, or Central Americans all have their own national identity, and don't really see commonalities between themselves and other Latinos. During the rise of the Tea Party, there are numerous policies targeting Latinxs, particularly Latinx immigrants, and there's a large increase in hate crimes against Latinos. This is also further demonstrated by Trump's presidential announcement speech in which he calls Mexican Americans rapists, murderers, and drug dealers. There is research that shows that where Trump had his rallies, there was an increase in hate crimes, particularly against Latinxs. As African Americans experience an increase in racial consciousness, Latinos also are experiencing an increase in racial consciousness.

I look at Latino linked fate: Do you think what happens to other Latinos broadly has an effect on your own identity? If we look at the ANES in 2012, the majority of Latinos would say not really. The majority would say "none" or "a little" combined—that what happens to other Latinos in my pan-ethnic group has no real effect on my own life outcomes. But once you move into 2016, the year that Donald Trump is elected president, an almost super majority of 64

percent agree that what happens to other Latinos has a large effect on what happens in their own life. For these reasons, we see a renewal in racial consciousness amongst Latinos and blacks as well. A group that I don't talk as much about in the book is Asian Americans. I do discuss them a little bit in the conclusion, as they are the fastest growing racial and ethnic group in the United States. Right before the 2016 election, they too have lower levels of linked fate than they do right after. So, they seem to be following a similar pattern, although I don't have as good of data on that racial and ethnic group.

All of this leads to my argument that things have changed in the United States. White Democrats, blacks, and Latinos have become much more racially progressive and look to the Democratic Party to provide some type of relief to racial inequality in the United States. At the same time, polarization makes it so we're set in our vote choice. Democrats vote for Democrats. Republicans vote for Republicans. Independents are just shy partisans for the most part—they're either consistently Democrat or consistently Republican voters, but they don't want to identify with either political party. There's a small segment that swings, but most of the elections now are based on turnout. I wanted to see then: Do candidates who focus on racially progressive outreach perform better in elections? I have multiple tests, but I'm just going to present two.

The first is looking at measures of racial progressivism. One of the things that the ANES asked people is: Do you think Democratic presidential candidates—Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012, John Kerry in 2004, Al Gore in 2000, Hillary Clinton in 2016—think the best way to address racial inequality is to make changes in government? That response is on one end of the scale. Or do you think the best way to make change is that blacks should help themselves and that there shouldn't be any type of racial outreach? The ANES asked voters to place themselves on the scale. Higher scores on the scale mean that you're more likely to believe that the presidential candidate thinks that the government needs to address racial inequality head on, rather than have a laissez-faire fair approach where the market sets things. That's what I use for my independent variable. Then I use that to predict vote choice, measured as: Did you vote for the Democratic candidate or did you vote for another candidate? And then turnout: Did you vote in that election or not? Both of these are self-reported.

I anticipate and control for numerous factors that would also predict vote choice. I don't control for partisanship because I look at different groups of partisans. I anticipated based on my review, that polarization would make it so that perceptions of racial liberalism wouldn't matter in 2016. If you're a Democrat, you're going to vote for the Democratic Party. If you're Republican, you vote for the Republican Party. Same for the independents. But I did think it would matter in turnout. Candidates who put forth a racially progressive agenda are going to mobilize voters to be more likely to turnout. This is where Democrats might make significant gains by talking about racial issues.

The results of test one are as expected: polarization basically drives vote choice. There are some years when Barack Obama was seen as being racially progressive. Then white Democrats and white independents are less likely to vote for him. In 2016 that all disappears. Regardless of whether people saw Hillary Clinton as racially progressive or not—and this is true for white Democrats, white independents, white Republicans, African Americans, and Latinos—that didn't have any effect on their vote choice. Whether she was racially progressive or racially conservative, voters had made up their minds beforehand. Party was the strongest predictor of vote choice. But when I look at turnout, there's a significant relationship. White Democrats, African Americans, and Latinxs all become more likely to vote in 2016 when they perceive Hillary Clinton as being racially liberal. And there's no relationship for any other candidate in any of the

other years. It shows that in the current political context, discussions of racial appeals can mobilize voters.

I think this is where more research needs to be done. Hillary Clinton did make racial appeals. The Mothers of the Movement, who are tied to the Black Lives Matter movement, were given a primetime spot at the Democratic National Convention. Hillary Clinton talked about Black Lives Matter in her campaign, and she had a section on her website called Racial Justice. So, she did make progressive racial appeals. Why then weren't there higher levels of turnout? One of the reasons for that could be driven by the fact that there was a heavy campaign, both by the Trump administration and by Russian troll farms, to paint Hillary Clinton as being more racially conservative than she was. We know the Trump campaign ran an advertisement called "Super Predators" which brought up a comment that she made in the 1990s. In the commercial they say that is how Hillary Clinton talks about black youth. We know also more recently that the Trump campaign had a deterrence program aimed at African Americans to get them to think Hillary Clinton and the Democratic Party didn't care about them. So, all of these might be a reason why her progressive racial appeals were ineffective, or that more voters didn't see her as being racially progressive in 2016.

I also run a set of experiments. I run them on MTurk but I've since done several other studies on Lucid, Academia, and Qualtrics, and find similar results. I ran an experiment where I randomly assigned individuals to one of two candidates, and those candidates talked about either economically liberal issues or racially liberal issues. Half were assigned to one candidate who talks about racial justice. He argues for strengthening the Voting Rights Act, fixing our broken criminal justice system, protecting immigrants' rights, and advocating for comprehensive immigration reform. The other half was randomly assigned to a candidate who talked about economic justice—strengthening the National Labor Relations Act, fixing our broken financial system, protecting workers' rights, and advocating for a mandatory living wage. If my expectations are correct, in the general election, party should wipe things out.

I have two candidates who I say are Democratic candidates, who could be presidential candidates in 2020. This was done in 2017 before the race was set, so most voters probably wouldn't know that these candidates didn't exist. After individuals read these two different experiments, I asked: Would you vote for this candidate in the primaries against Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton? Would you vote for this candidate in the general election if the opponent is Mitt Romney or Donald Trump? And then I asked: How enthusiastic would you be to vote if these candidates were on the ballot in 2020? I again expect that the racial justice candidate will at least increase enthusiasm to vote.

What I find is that in the primaries there is preference—particularly amongst African Americans, who are much more supportive of the racially liberal candidate than they are of the economically liberal candidate when pitted against Hillary Clinton or Bernie Sanders. But as was true in the ANES, party determined who you were going to vote for. Democrats were more likely to vote for the hypothetical Democratic candidate against Mitt Romney or against Donald Trump in 2020. Republicans, and those leaning in that direction, were more likely to vote for the Republican candidate in those years. Whether or not you got the economically liberal candidate or the racially liberal candidate in the general election, it didn't really affect vote choice. But again, I found that white Democrats, blacks, and Latinxs express more enthusiasm to vote when the racialized candidate was on the ballot. They were much more likely to say they really support this candidate and would turn out if that candidate was on the ballot.

I think one thing to consider, and hopefully I have shown evidence of this, is that white Democrats, blacks, and Latinos tend to be much more enthusiastic to vote for racially progressive candidates rather than deracialized candidates. One of the things that makes this coalition

of voters much more formidable going into the future is that the country is changing rapidly in its demography. There are several states that are already majority-minority including California, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Texas. Several states will become majority-minority in the next 10 years including Nevada, Maryland, Georgia, Florida, Arizona, New Jersey, and New York. Then the majority of the country will be majority-minority by 2050—when several states will also be majority-minority including Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia. When I say majority-minority, I mean that racial and ethnic minorities combined will be the majority of the population and whites will only be the plurality of the population.

As these groups change demographically, it is not always safe to assume that they vote for the Democratic Party, but we do know that they're more mobilized and supportive of racially progressive candidates. Putting together a coalition of these voters could be a pathway to success nationally and in several states. A good example of this is the Obama coalition. Obama got less of the white vote in 2012 than Michael Dukakis received in 1988. While Michael Dukakis was wiped out by George H. W. Bush, Barack Obama won with a majority of votes by being able to put together a coalition of white Democrats, African Americans, Latinxs, Asian Americans, and other underrepresented groups.

One of the arguments I make in my book—assuming the context remains constant with voters more likely to agree that racial discrimination continues to be a problem—is that discussing racial issues becomes much more of a potent strategy going into the future, because these groups grow as a size of the population and as the size of the electorate. We're already seeing this in several states. Arizona, for example, was a state that was safely Republican. It is now becoming much more Democratic. States like Georgia, which will soon be majority-minority, and Texas, whose electorate is now majority-minority, are becoming much more competitive than they've been in the past.

In conclusion, I think Dr. Hamilton implores us to think about the political context when applying the deracialization strategy. And of course, context can change a lot over time. I expect that it'll change in the near future. He calls on us to constantly update this model, to think about how the context is shaping use of racial appeals. In my book, I argue that the polarization has made it so that parties should think less about cross-pressured voters and think more about mobilizing voters. A deracialization strategy actually depresses, rather than increases, turnout amongst the Obama coalition of Democratic whites, blacks, and Latinos. Demographic changes provide a larger advantage to this.

Certainly, the best part of my book is that Professor Hamilton wrote the foreword. What took me 250 pages to write, he wrote in two pages. It is a real succinct encapsulation of my argument in a much more eloquent and better way than my own. I'm really honored to present. I can't express enough my gratitude for Professor Hamilton's work in this area. Thank you so much for giving me this opportunity.

FUCHS: Thanks so much, Chris. There is so much you covered in your presentation. Now I'm going to ask Fred to comment.

FREDRICK C. HARRIS[4]**:** Thanks so much, Chris, for that wonderful presentation and congratulations on the new book. Before I go into my comments, I remember when Chris presented aspects of these arguments at a conference on deracialization at Nuffield College, Oxford. Chris also presented, as he mentioned earlier, at the commemorative conference held at Columbia in

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honor of Chuck Hamilton that celebrated the 50-year mark of the publication of Hamilton's and Ture's book *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation*.

In many ways, the book *Black Power* laid the foundations for scholarship on what has become known today as identity politics. The book *Black Power* discussed the need for African Americans as a marginalized group in American life to close ranks, to see themselves as a collective political force. As Chuck Hamilton noted then, and when he usually instructs people about what he meant about identity politics in *Black Power*, he always refers to page 44, where it is written, "before any group can enter the open society it must first close ranks."

This was basically a call for ethnic pluralism to be practiced among African Americans. We've seen this call of identity politics among other marginalized groups, whether it's Latinx communities or LGBTQ activists. Given the search for recognition—the search for rights of different groups that identify themselves in a particular way in American political life—the idea of identity politics has gained far more currency in American politics now than it did then.

I'm not going to go forward, as Chris did, from *Black Power* in the late 1960s to 1970s. I want to go back in a reflective way because I want to make the argument that the case for identity politics has already been made if we look at it from a historical lens. And not so much from a marginalized community of African Americans and other marginalized groups, but from the practice of white identity politics. I'll tell you what I mean by that in a moment. Both Hamilton and Ture saw what white ethnic groups were doing in the United States in the time that they were writing, and what they had done in cities across the United States. The Poles and the Irish had banded together in solidarity to gain political power and recognition in a city like Chicago. In New York, then and now, but predominantly then, European immigrants and their descendants formed and dominated party organizations and enclaves across the five boroughs in New York City. Boston was dominated by the Irish, and Philadelphia by the Italians.

These groups closed ranks in order to gain political power and to help facilitate integration and assimilation of European immigrants into American political life. While they were collectively known as white ethnics, their identities were not devoid of their own process of racial identity formation. I think providing this longer context helps us understand what's going on in contemporary American political life around the issues of identity.

Historians, not political scientists, have long written about how various European groups not only became white, but also developed a politically conscious white racial identity. There are many works, but particularly David Roediger's book, *Working Toward Whiteness: How American Immigrants Became White*, and Matthew Jacobson's *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race*. These works document the racialization of Europeans and their descendants in the United States. The process of the formation of a white identity in the United States, in my view, raised questions about how this form of identity formation influenced American politics then. And, as I said before, how it influenced it in contemporary American politics. If we understand the historical formation of a racialization of people who became known as white in the United States—a formation I would argue that developed over centuries—there would be no need to make a case for identity politics today.

I would argue that the case has already been made. To provide some context to what I mean here, I'm going to draw on the work of political theorist Judith Shklar, and in particular her book, *American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion.* I'm going to draw as well on the work of our colleague who's on this panel, Ira Katznelson, in his book, *When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth Century America*. Though Shklar did not specifically discuss the role of identity politics and how Americans throughout have talked about their need to earn a right to a living wage and their right to the franchise, the politics of identity has had a long history in American life. Each group of people of European

descent—when advocating for their rights as women's suffragists or union organizers—define themselves against the enslaved and their descendants. As Shklar observed, the meaning of American citizenship was birthed as a counterpoint to chattel slavery. The quest for inclusion, and for civic recognition in the United States, has been tied to gaining the right to the franchise and having the right to earn a living as a free worker. These were two rights that slaves were denied, and their descendants continuously fought for after emancipation. To quote Shklar, she argues that in the United States, "to be less than a full citizen is at the very least to approach the dreaded condition of a slave."

Ira Katznelson documents in *When Affirmative Action Was White*, how the New Deal policies—and we heard through Chris the importance of the New Deal coalition—conferred material benefits to whites, while excluding African Americans from many of those benefits. Some social policies, many of us already know this story, disproportionately excluded African Americans without ever mentioning race in the crafting of those policies. For instance, the Social Security Act initially did not cover domestic workers and agricultural workers, two occupations that were dominated by African Americans during the period of the creation of the act. This provision was pushed by Southern members of Congress who wanted to continue to control black labor in the South.

So again, identity politics has been with us for quite a while. Part of it is what I see in the moment that we're in now, as a resurgence of white identity. This occurred not so much under Trump, as has already been mentioned by Chris, but also during the presidency of Barack Obama. White identities have become far more politicized than they used to be looking within a post-civil rights era. Today, for instance, about half of white Americans believe that white people as a group are discriminated against. Against this backdrop, we have seen the resurgence of what I would describe as hardcore white identities in the Trump era—known more famously as white supremacy and the rise of hate groups.

There is a rise of identity politics, of marginalized groups, as Chris has documented in his book, and what appears to be the rise of white racial identities of various sorts, not just in white supremacist organizations. There is an interesting study by political scientist Ashley Jardina at Duke University. She has a book called *White Identity Politics*, and what she reports in this study is that somewhere between 30 to 40 percent of whites today view their racial identity in a politically meaningful way. In making the case for identity politics, and with the rise of white identity politics in various manifestations, what I see is a continuing polarization in American politics for many, many years to come.

FUCHS: Before we ask Chris to respond and discuss, I would like to ask Ira Katznelson to please comment.

KATZNELSON: Chris, thank you so much for this vibrant talk and for the terrifically interesting book. Much appreciated. I would put the question you raised in the following way: Under what conditions does the politics of racial appeal to increase turnout become more significant than a politics of deracialized politics appealing to swing the voters? That's my shorthand for your question. I would ask not whether we should answer that question once and for all, but exactly as you say, and exactly as Professor Hamilton has insisted from the beginning the right question is: Under what conditions will one or the other hold? And that leads me to forms of speculation about which large scale changes in American life, since say the middle of the twentieth century, would most help shape that answer—not give us the answer—but create the conditions for

exploring the answer. My own list is four. One you have touched on and underscored is the demographic change. I won't repeat what you said.

Second, is a really quite profound religious transformation, particularly within American Protestantism. In 1950, the mainstream Protestant churches were dominant, and evangelicals were, if anything, not only a minority of Protestants, but well outside ordinary politics. Ever since the 1920s Scopes Trials on evolution, evangelicals had become one of the largest groups of non-voters in American life. This situation utterly has been transformed in a double sense. Mainstream Protestant denominations have declined significantly in membership. Evangelical churches have been dramatically on the rise and became politicized—not least around issues of abortion and sexuality, but also around issues of race.

The third big change, not unrelated to the evangelical rise, has been the profound realignment of politics in the American South. A once secure Democratic haven in the age of Jim Crow has become not an entirely secure Republican haven, but Republicans begin any presidential election as Democrats once did with a big a priori boost from the Southern states.

Finally, and not trivially, because this affects the swing of white voters, is the decline of private industrial unions. In 1950–1955, just over one-third of all private-wage workers—peaking at 35 or 36 percent in the mid-1950s—belonged to unions. Today it is only about 6 percent. The unions were, and continue to be, active in interpreting politics for their members. But the absence of unions, the realignment of the South, religious changes, and demographic changes, were all in the mix, both for the Obama and Trump campaigns, and contributed to Hillary's defeat.

A second big set of transformations, I think, may have come within the meaning of being black in America or the African American condition—which is immensely complicated. It would be much too simple to talk about a racial or racist versus non-racial or non-racist world if you think about different dimensions of physical segregation or physical security, or the place of African Americans within the larger culture of the United States. By culture, I mean everything from presence or absence in television and movies, music, sports, you name it. The place of blacks in the political economy of the United States has dramatically bifurcated since the 1950s. And there has been great change to the place of African Americans in political life. Each one of these is complex and somewhat different than it was. So, a racial appeal and identity appeal have different meanings today. The issue of policing, which has come to the fore with incredibly ugly and tragic events, produces one kind of mobilization, but there are other forms of racial mobilization which are less prominent. I would love to hear your comments about how these macro changes to America shape the meaning of deracialization or racialization as appeal.

Finally, two footnotes. One, you compared Obama's white votes to Dukakis's, but if you had compared these to John Kerry's, you would have reached a different conclusion. Obama did better than Kerry amongst whites everywhere but Alabama, Mississippi, and parts of Appalachia. Swing voting did happen for Obama, as well as racialized turnout. How did they succeed in doing that? Because the decline from Dukakis to Kerry was greater than the declines from Dukakis to Obama. Last, the issue of deracialization that you rightly stressed in electoral terms, could also be asked, say as William Julius Wilson has, in policy terms. If we wish to affect the life conditions of African Americans or Latinx Americans, today, especially those most poor, which strategies work best to represent the racial or transracial appeal? Arguably, the Affordable Care Act has done more to affect the life conditions of the many poor Americans, including African Americans, than almost any other recent piece of legislation. Yet is a transracial legislation.

FUCHS: Chris, we'll go back to you and allow you to comment.

STOUT: Thank you everyone for your comments and thoughts about this. These are really important topics that shaped my own research and thoughts about deracialization and identity politics in the United States. So again, I thank all of you for your scholarship because I think it's been really important in my own research.

I'll start with Professor Harris's comments. I could have written a different book. I think there's two stories here that are occurring. On one hand, I think the Democratic Party is becoming more racially liberal. Equally important is the growth of white identity politics in recent years. While my story focuses on Obama's election, the Tea Party, and then Black Lives Matter mobilizing African Americans, Latinxs, and liberal whites, a similar story could be told where white Americans see Barack Obama as a threat to their position in the United States. Demographic changes, coupled with the results of the 2008 election at the lower level in the House and in the Senate, led to a resurgence of white political identity, which then just changes over time. Tali Mendelberg, and her famous book on racial appeals, argues that white voters are turned off by discussions of race because it's outside of the social norm. However, we know from more recent research that white voters become much more accepting of explicitly racist appeals.

So why argue that blacks become more accepting and more mobilized by Democratic candidates making racially progressive appeals? We see that there's a side of whites who like a racially charged or explicitly racist rhetoric. There's a large segment of the white population that doesn't condemn Donald Trump when he doesn't speak out against white supremacy. In fact, they become more mobilized by his actions. Trump was cognizant of what he was doing. He was going to mobilize his base. He wasn't going to look for swing voters who would be turned off by racially insensitive appeals, but he was going to hyper charge the white racially conservative or white racists in society who were going to be mobilized by his type of outreach. In this case, you really have two competing stories. You have candidates in the Democratic Party making more racially liberal appeals, and those who are making much more racially conservative appeals over time. I think the answer then goes to demography.

I think the appeals that Donald Trump makes were effective for Nixon in 1968 and in 1972, and to a lesser extent, but still successful, for Reagan in the 1980s. There were just more of those voters who supported that. What demographic changes? It becomes harder and harder for the Republican Party to survive without receiving the support of Latinos, African Americans, and Asian Americans. There's a group of demographers at the Brookings Institute who have done a lot of analysis looking at how much of the white vote the Republicans have to win to succeed going forward. And by 2032, if they're going to win any national election, it has to be 80 percent of white voters. This includes 20 percent of those who are already strongly Democratic. So you're going to have to take away people who are really entrenched within the Democratic Party. I think the counter phenomenon of white identity and the growth of white identity politics, which I think has grown in recent years, is something that deserves more attention. And I unfortunately didn't do it as much in my book.

To Professor Katznelson's point, I think this is correct. The crux of the argument is the conditions. I look at conditions starting in 2008, but the conditions that laid the groundwork for what we live in today is a much larger trend. You point out several of these, some of which I discuss a little bit in the book, and some of which I don't.

Political realignment is one of these. The Democratic Party losing the South to the Republican Party has changed what the strategy should be for the Party to win. They basically have to write off the South. As you mentioned, Obama did better than Kerry in most places, except for in the South. I believe it's either Alabama or Mississippi, he only received somewhere near one-tenth of white male voters. I think the process of realignment is something that's occurring now.

We can see it going into the 2020 election around racial appeals. Non-college-educated whites are moving in one direction, but college-educated whites, particularly those with a higher socioeconomic status who live in the suburbs, are being pushed away from the Republican Party. I have some other research which shows they become much more responsive to progressive racial outreach.

What is happening in the country in this realignment is driving a lot of work around identity politics. I think your call for outlining the conditions is so important. As I was writing this book, I thought about the conditions that laid the groundwork to the abolitionist movement in the 1830s, 1840s, 1850s, and 1860s, and then the downfall. I'm also interested in when does it end? Why does it end? Then I thought about the conditions that led to the rise of the civil rights movement in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. A lot of the things that you touched upon explain why we had those movements at those times. Religious transformations in the United States were key to the abolitionist movement and the civil rights movement. Religious transformations may be playing a role in the movement that we're seeing today and in discussions around racial appeals today. That's something, unfortunately, I didn't take as seriously enough as I should have in the book.

I do talk a lot about the decline in trade unions. I think the changing economy in the United States has created mass levels of inequality. That has two effects. Going to Professor Harris's first point is that this creates a sense of racial threat for some. They're losing their position in society, and that also leads to more support of racially conservative appeals. On the other hand, African American youth are doing worse today than their parents. That's not true for all groups, and this is particularly bad for blacks in the middle class. So, for blacks who had middle-class jobs in the 1980s and 1990s, their children have much less wealth and income today. That's driven by the decline of trade unions and the shrinking of government jobs, where African Americans were largely hired. I then think this reignites the idea that racial discrimination is still a significant problem—that economic inequality around race is something that needs to be dealt with.

One thing I'd like to add to that is the role of technology and the role of empathy. I think people for a long period of time were not aware of the levels of racial discrimination happening to African Americans. In the 1960s, television events like Bloody Sunday awakened Americans to the idea that more needs to be done to give blacks the right to vote. Today, the role of technology allows us to see egregious violence against black bodies, which then changes attitudes about what needs to be done to rectify these situations. I think your argument is important and I think more needs to be done to look at the conditions in the United States.

Finally, policy. My book is focused more on an electoral aspect, but I think you're right about this. My hope, in my own research and others', is that there needs to be more discussions about the effect of policies. I think the context in the United States has been one, as you point out in your previous work, where African Americans were largely kept out of any type of opportunity over time until the 1960s or 1970s when we become more static in the economic ladder. People during this period of time can be born at the bottom and work their way up. Because African Americans were kept out of land ownership in the 1850s and 1860s, and kept out of these important social services in the 1930s and 1940s, as a group there was just really little opportunity to succeed. Rectifying some of those policies, the sins of the past which lead to this condition of lack of opportunities for African Americans, is crucial going forward.

FUCHS: Let me frame some of the questions from our audience. I'll put out two or three of these questions at once. Then I'll ask Chris to start, but I'd also love for Fred and Ira to jump in too when they feel it's appropriate.

There was one general question about the cross-pressured voters in the 1970s. Do you consider them similar to the moderate voters of today, in terms of your definition of these voters and how they're impacting the coalitions that form around racialized politics? The second question is about the reparations movement, and this goes to the question of context and conditions Ira pointed out. Has the reparations movement itself contributed in some way to either racialization or deracialization? Thirdly, it's a question about white supremacy in the context of contemporary politics and whether or not white supremacy can be understood as a form of identity politics, which I think is a fairly complex question, but very important. Finally, does deracialization have a lesser or a greater appeal to young voters today in terms of their engagement in national politics?

STOUT: I'll start with the cross-pressured questions of moderates today and moderates in the past. I think of moderates and cross-pressured voters as being different types of voters in some ways. I think moderates are more afraid of large-scale changes to society and want the status quo. They play some role in elections today. But I think that there's just been a decline in the number of swing voters. There were more Clinton-Bush voters, than there were Bush-Obama voters, than there were Obama-Trump voters. We see this pattern where people, particularly people who will habitually vote, become less and less swinged. It's just hard. If you're paying attention to politics, the parties are so drastically different.

The second question around reparations, I think is a really fascinating one. A lot of the things that I discussed are in terms of racial policies, and most of the experiments I ran are focused on things that are generally popular—like voting rights, immigration reform, and reparations. There has been increased support for reparations in terms of public policy. But it's certainly not as popular as voting rights. I think if there's a context where there could be something done around reparations, this would be it. But even that is a heavy lift, I think. I'd like to defer to my colleagues here.

White supremacy is absolutely identity politics, and I think it's probably the dominant form of identity politics used. It's why it's so hard, I think, for Donald Trump to condemn white supremacists. He sees those who are at least sympathetic to the movement as being a significant part of his base.

The demographic changes that I talk about are racial and ethnic, but I think a real big part of this story is the change in attitudes amongst millennials and particularly Generation Z. Politico had a fantastic set of articles this week on Generation Z where they say that even conservatives in Generation Z want more to be done to address identity-based inequality amongst African Americans, Latinxs, LGBTQ, women, etcetera. Part of the changes that make racial appeals more effective is that young voters are becoming a larger portion of the electorate. I think this is the first election millennials will at least be the majority of the population going into this election.

HARRIS: I have a specific question for Chris. I was fascinated by the quote you presented by Charles V. Hamilton that deracialization should not be used every time. It depends on the context. I guess this goes back to Ira's question of conditions. But it also goes to when we look specifically at black politics, and so reparations is also a part of this in a way. It's also a question about agenda setting, and expressing the political preferences of a very complex and large community, even though the majority of them vote Democrat. If there's going to be this strategy, how is this information disseminated to black communities across the country? How is it that they can coordinate this idea of when to accept a deracialized strategy or not to accept the deracialized strategy? How does this all work out concretely in real politics?

FUCHS: I'm going to jump in and piggyback on this question, because there was some similarity to what I was thinking. It sounded to me like much of your research makes it look like blacks are just reactive to what whites are thinking. Without bringing into this analysis the campaign—identity politics as a tool in the campaign—it feels like there's not much distinction between what's inherently part of identity politics that could ultimately be potentially deracialized as a tool for blacks, whites, or Hispanics. What really is the tool of a political campaign that uses this to either depress or mobilize voters?

HARRIS: Also, to piggyback on what you said, there are ideological differences within black communities. There are a lot of black social conservatives that people don't often recognize. There are also black progressives, and there are also the medium, the black liberals. There is the black vote, there's a black constituency, but they do have varying ideological currents that run throughout the community. Also, there are some people within the community who see reparations as a priority, while others think it's not a priority and that it's divisive. I think that there's some sort of political education that has to be a part of this. I speculate that the reason why reparations has emerged as an agenda setting item within black politics is because there's some disappointment in people's perception of what the Obama presidency could deliver in changing the material conditions of African Americans.

STOUT: I have two thoughts about this, which I talked about in the book and I've thought a little bit about afterwards. I think one of the shortcomings of the book in fairness is that I treat black voters as a model. As Fred pointed out, they tend to disproportionately support the Democratic Party in high numbers. The issues that I talk about in terms of racialized appeals in the book, and in a lot of my other research, tend to be those which have high levels of support within the African American community, like voting rights. Even if there's disagreement about other social issues, and I think there's disagreement within the black community about reparations, for example, the issues that I have focused on tended to be those which were more close to universally supported amongst African Americans.

I think this matters, and there's good work by Valeria Sinclair-Chapman that shows this matters. There is some symbolism to it. I think your book, Fred, *The Price of the Ticket*, talks about this a little bit as well. There is some power in having someone talk about your issues. There can also be a disempowerment effect. Even if Barack Obama is not publicly talking about racial issues, the expectation is that he's going to materially change the positions of African Americans when he has the opportunity. The wink and nod strategy, I think you discussed in your book.

My book is more focused on the electoral strategy side of it. I think it's driven more by the idea of what candidates can do to at least project that they care about African Americans. A lot of my work is interested in empathy. Do you feel like the politician cares about you? Because that matters so much. For a long period of time, for most of American history, African Americans were largely disregarded, and to have politicians come out and show that they care either through substantive or symbolic acts, I think matters a lot.

I think most politicians, unfortunately, focus more on the symbolic aspect of it. But that's not necessarily devoid of policy. Biden selecting Kamala Harris as his vice president is symbolic. But Kamala Harris, and this is true of most black representatives in the right context, will likely do more for African Americans in general than white representatives. There's tons of work that shows this. In terms of practice, it is maybe a lot of symbolism and focusing on issues which are more universally accepted. I don't think politicians, as political scientists like myself, take enough into account that there is a lot of diversity within the black community.

FUCHS: I'm going to ask Ira to jump in. Then we'll have Wilmot give his comments. Chris you'll have the last word.

KATZNELSON: A very brief historical observation when we talk about swing voters, arguably in the 1940s and into the early 1960s. African Americans in the North were some of the most important swing voters. Their party position was unpredictable. Of course, before the New Deal, those who could vote, outside the South principally, were overwhelmingly Republican. The party of Lincoln as opposed to the party of racial segregation and Jim Crow. In the Roosevelt years, the social policies that included blacks, not the ones from which they were excluded, were relief policies and all kinds of job policies, which a person experiencing terrible poverty appreciated. There were symbolic gestures at least by the first lady, if not by the president, which also mattered. But Eisenhower and Nixon did exceptionally well with black votes. In many states, New York for example, black votes put Truman over the top in the Truman/Dewey campaign. That was in part a very self-conscious result of a self-conscious appeal. It was in the summer of 1948 that the president signed an executive order desegregating the military. We understood this wasn't going to appeal to his southern supporters in this era of Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond running for president and winning the deep South, but it did make a big difference in the North.

Arguably, Richard Nixon was a more pro-civil rights candidate in 1960 than John Kennedy. Adlai Stevenson had asked Sparkman of Alabama, a Jim Crow Democrat, to be his vice-presidential running mate. We're talking about a moment in which African American voting power was pretty profound, ironically, maybe. It's become in some ways less so as a 90 percent monolith. That itself is the product of a Republican choice to opt for the Southern strategy and a kind of racialized white identity appeal, which was a judgment made in the same way earlier by President Taft a long time ago—who said, if we're going to compete in the South, we'll have to exceed the Jim Crow. I think in short there's been a division historically, not only the strange bedfellows within the Democratic Party. There's been division in the Republican Party historically from the early twentieth century to the present between a party on one or another side of the race spectrum.

FUCHS: Thanks, Ira. I'm going to ask Wilmot to comment now.

WILMOT G. JAMES[5]**:** I had a question for Christopher about where the weight of thinking was among the leadership in the African American community. If I can use the example of South Africa in this case, when Nelson Mandela became president, the first offer on the table as an electoral slogan was "Now is the time." There was a group of leaders in the African National Congress who said that sounds like revenge. They came up with an alternative, "A better life for all." An inclusive slogan.

That was Mandela—no racial appeals at all. Once he left office, he was replaced by Thabo Mbeki who made racial appeals. He spoke about South Africa as consisting of two nations—one was white and one was black. With reference to Charles Dickens, he spoke about them inhabiting two different kinds of worlds. The reason why I mention that is that once you start on the road of making racial appeals, you run the real risk of creating racial electoral blocks. Once you do that, and they become rigid and fixed, then elections become racial censuses. Now this might be a South African concern because our demography is very different to the United States, but that is a real risk.

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People worry about that because I think that's not very democratic. People are not voting on a basis of issues or policy choices. They vote on the basis of the block they belong to. So what is required is probably a balance between those two kinds of things. But my general observation is that leaders, and what they think, make a huge difference. And the question is where is the weight or thinking in the leadership? Is it towards a non-racial approach? Is it towards strengthening racial appeals? Where is that thinking and what is your sense of the thinking in American leadership?

STOUT: Thanks so much for that important question. It's hard to say that there's one group of leaders, but I think this is true in any social movement. There's a lot of research that shows that there is some inequality. Even within movements that are fighting inequality, there's inequality within those movements. If I were to talk about leadership, I would say it would be probably more conservatives within the African American community who are discussing issues like the ones that I mentioned, like voting rights. If we look at black members of Congress, there's a lot of discussion. Of course, there's always bills brought up around reparations, but things like that are much more progressive and tend to get less attention amongst elected officials.

You mentioned racial appeals and the effect on American politics. A warning that I discussed is that racial appeals do lead to more polarization. This is a problem. If white identity is becoming a much more dominant part of American politics, seeing the Democratic Party as more racialized just pushes some whites to being more conservative, and then maybe in some ways more extreme. While racial appeals, I think, are a good electoral strategy in the short term, the long-term effects certainly need to be discussed in terms of polarization and in terms of the health of democracy. I think it's so important to address that the inequality in this country has always been bad, but it's just worsening over time. It's important that politicians not ignore this. Ignoring these issues and ignoring racial inequality only exacerbates the problem. I think it's important to address it head-on while being cognizant of what some of the long-term effects might be.

FUCHS: Thanks, Chris. We have sadly already gone over time, and this has been an important discussion. I just want to step in as my role as moderator here to say thank you to everyone who's participated this afternoon—to Chris for the research and enlightening discussion, and to Fred, Ira, and Wilmot for your commentary and insight. This is a complex question. We really have to be cognizant of conditions and elections and the strategic use of racialization and deracialization. It works until it doesn't work in some ways. That produces a change in politics that we can anticipate will continue to happen in American politics because of the need to create coalitions, and the differences that Wilmot pointed out to us between South Africa and the United States in terms of demography.

Once again, thank you to the Department of Political Science, SIPA, African American and African Diaspora Studies, and to the Academy. A special thanks to Wilmot for helping us organize, once again, a very exciting seminar. I hope Chuck gets to see this. I know he would appreciate it. Thanks all of you who attended. We had an extraordinary attendance today. And we hope to see you again soon. Take care everyone.