The Academy of Political Science

475 Riverside Drive · Suite 1274 · New York, New York 10115-1274

(212) 870-2500 · FAX: (212) 870-2202 · aps@psqonline.org · http://www.psqonline.org

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Volume 114 · Number 3 · Fall 1999

No part of this article may be copied, downloaded, stored, further transmitted, transferred, distributed, altered, or otherwise used, in any form or by any means, except:

- one stored electronic and one paper copy of any article solely for your personal, non-commercial use, or
- with prior written permission of The Academy of Political Science.

Political Science Quarterly is published by The Academy of Political Science. Contact the Academy for further permission regarding the use of this work.

Political Science Quarterly

Copyright © 1999 by The Academy of Political Science. All rights reserved.

Krehbiel uses the family-leave bills in the Bush administration (on which the representatives at the veto point were pivotal) and in the Clinton administration (which passed with a large bipartisan coalition) and of the Clinton economic stimulus package in the 103rd Congress (on which the senator at the filibuster point was pivotal) to illustrate his theory. He concludes that his theory works to explain the two basic facts—including the seemingly anomalous existence of nonpartisan gridlock—by relating policy positions to the status quo, the position of the president, and the positions of the veto and filibuster pivots.

What is missing in this discussion is recognition that the theory implies a unicameral legislature and thus does not incorporate a key feature of the Congress, bicameralism. In addition, Krehbiel seems to imply, but does not state, that threats of filibusters or vetoes are strategies in the lawmaking process that might well mask actual pivot points.

In the remainder of the book, Krehbiel lays out empirical tests of each of the component parts of the theory; then he goes on to demonstrate applications for the theory. The strength of this book is the careful and systematic way in which Krehbiel takes the reader through his theory. In that, *Pivotal Politics* is a model for how formal theorists can present their views to a wider audience. The contribution of the theory means that all future analysts of the lawmaking process will have important factors to consider as they attempt to explain outcomes. Krehbiel focuses attention on the implications of the supermajoritarian requirements of the lawmaking process and the implications of those, as well as the positions of the president and lawmakers, for moving from the status quo. For these reasons, it seems clear that *Pivotal Politics* will find its place among the most influential books in the American field.

L. Sandy Maisel
Colby College

A World Transformed: The Collapse of the Soviet Empire, The Unification of Germany, Tiananmen Square, The Gulf War *by George Bush and Brent Scowcroft. New York, Knopf, 1998. 590 pp. $30.00.*

A wise senior colleague of mine, commenting on an essay I had written about American diplomacy in Europe after World War II, wrote, "Be careful with success stories. We academics generally don't care for them." I would guess that many academics will not care for this volume by President George Bush and his National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. The book depicts an extraordinarily successful period in American diplomacy, during which the United States achieved such cold war objectives as the end of Soviet control over Eastern Europe and the unification of Germany within the NATO alliance. These goals seemed unrealistic dreams when Bush became President in January 1989. Bush and his team accomplished these long-sought objectives without humiliating Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership, or as Bush disdainfully puts it, "dancing" on the Berlin Wall. In the end Bush and Scowcroft even engineered the diplomacy that would help prevent the final collapse of the Soviet Union in August 1991 from leading to widespread conflict. Although known for his modesty, President Bush allows himself a moment of justified pride when he and Scowcroft write in their prologue that because of their efforts, "We eluded the shadow of another Versailles" (p. xiv).

The book is not a comprehensive look at the Bush foreign policy. Noteworthy by its absence is any discussion of the administration's lack of response to the initial break-up of

Yugoslavia, a time when some believe that Slobodan Milosevic's trouble making might have been nipped in the bud. On the other hand, Bush and Scowcroft are forthright in dealing with one of the most controversial aspects of the Bush foreign policy, their reaction to the Chinese government's massacre of students in Tiananmen Square. Both men condemn the action, and both were appalled by the behavior of the Chinese leaders. Yet it is also clear that each had quite a stake in China. Both were involved in opening up the country to America in the 1970s, and neither wanted to see the relationship endangered by the violent suppression of the Chinese democracy movement. Within days of the event, Bush sent a private letter to Deng Xiaoping, with the offer to send a special emissary — ultimately Scowcroft — and pleaded that "We must not let this important relationship suffer further" (p. 102). The authors make the case that their efforts helped elicit Chinese cooperation with the administration, especially during the Gulf War. But the unseemly haste with which they courted Beijing, especially in contrast to their strong warnings to Gorbachev against violence in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, does leave one wondering about a double standard in American foreign policy. What is it about China that has entranced Americans and distorted their judgment since the Open Door notes of a hundred years ago? We seem to find it difficult to develop a policy toward China consistent with both our values and interests. With the recent revelations about Chinese nuclear espionage, this debate is unlikely to end soon.

But give credit where credit is due. The George Bush in these pages is an incredibly knowledgeable and skilled leader, with a remarkable gift for personal diplomacy and coalition building. Bush and Scowcroft recapture the tension and suspense before and during the Gulf War, and remind us how difficult it was to convince Congress and the American people of the importance of that conflict. Many of their critics now look somewhat foolish, and although the authors do not seem particularly intent on settling scores, they provide a compelling defense of the administration's policy, including leaving Saddam Hussein in Baghdad. Curiously enough, this book about American successes ends with a dire warning against isolationism, and an insistence that we in America "live up to our responsibilities" (p. 566). Will we be hearing such a theme in a campaign speech from another Bush in the very near future?

THOMAS A. SCHWARTZ
Vanderbilt University

The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia *by Devin T. Hagerty. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1998. 205 pp. Paper, $17.50.*

Recent nuclear tests in South Asia refocused attention on a simmering debate: Can new nuclear states, many of which may lack the resources of the established nuclear powers, manage their nuclear weapons effectively and establish stable relationships of nuclear deterrence?

In *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation,* Devin Hagerty examines the debate with respect to two emerging nuclear states, India and Pakistan, and their recent security crises: the 1986–1987 Brasstacks crisis and the 1990 Kashmir crisis. Advocates of what Hagerty calls the "logic of nuclear deterrence" have argued that new nuclear states are likely to settle into stable deterrent relationships like the superpowers had during the cold war. But proponents of the logic of nonproliferation contend that nuclear proliferators will lack the geopo-