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ment was the crucial period in which the European security order was worked out among the allies. If there was ever a possibility that the French might have constructed a European security order less susceptible to Anglo-American dominance, the creation of an institutional framework such as the EDC was imperative. Yet despite the fact that the Americans were the greatest supporters of the French proposal and the ones who clearly saw the EDC as the mechanism for greater European self-sufficiency, it was the French themselves who ultimately dealt the final death blow to the EDC in 1954. A more comprehensive analysis of this paradox should be an essential element in any analysis of French policy during this period, but the author unfortunately treats the EDC much like the Gaullists did at the time—as an institutional framework contrary to French national interests and thus undesirable. However, if both the EDC and NATO were flawed institutions from the French perspective, one can only wonder about whether there was a potential alternative security that could have avoided the divisions that continue to plague the alliance. Instead of reiterating the familiar criticisms of NATO and EDC, it would have been far preferable if the author had used the conflicts of the period to explore the inherent weaknesses and limitations of the Gaullist critique of American and British foreign policy. This is particularly true since the history of the early 1950s illustrates many of the fundamental problems and contradictions that will surely reappear in the future as contemporary policy makers seek to restructure the alliance to meet the challenges that lie ahead. Nevertheless, American policy makers would certainly profit by studying Cogan's excellent account of the challenges and dilemmas faced by their predecessors.

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Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressure Can and Cannot Do *by Leonard J. Schoppa. New York, Columbia University Press, 1997. 406 pp. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $17.50.*

On 29 May 1989, the Bush administration proposed a new initiative in trade negotiations with Japan. Congress had thrust upon the free-trader administration the Super 301 provision of the 1988 Trade Act, which virtually forced it to label Japan as an ''unfair trader.'' But George Bush managed to avoid applying those provisions to informal barriers to trade by instead proposing the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII). The negotiations resulted in an agreement in 1990. Three years later, the Clinton administration tried to negotiate a more specific results-oriented agreement, especially in autos and auto parts, that came to be known as the ''Framework'' talks.

Leonard J. Scoppa's *Bargaining with Japan* takes as its primary subject the SII negotiations and its secondary one, as a comparison, the Framework talks. The book's argument is that *gaiatsu* (foreign pressure) can influence Japanese policy outcomes, especially when the Japanese political arena offers opportunities for employing synergist strategies that take advantage of divisions of opinion and interest on the Japanese side.

The SII talks actually consisted of five separable and identifiable issues and demands by the United States, all of which were designed to eliminate what the United States perceived to be policies and practices of the government and private sector that encouraged the Japanese from saving too much and spending too little buying foreign goods, or which discrimi-

nated and excluded foreign firms from the Japanese market: first, implementing macroeconomic policies to get Japan to increase its public investment spending; second, reforming Japan's distribution system, especially its Large Store Law (LSL); third, lowering Japan's exorbitant land prices; fourth, reducing private sector collusive practices; finally, reforming Japan's *keiretsu* corporate groups. The United States got essentially much of what it wanted in the first and second, some of what it wanted in the third, and virtually no Japanese concessions in the fourth and fifth. What accounts for this variation?

Schoppa takes this question as the opportunity to use the very structure of the SII talks themselves as a systematic research design. By comparing the process and outcomes of these multidimensional talks, he can focus on when American pressure works and when it doesn't, and why. He holds constant such variables as time period and conditions, and even in a broad sense, type of issue (practices and policies that serve as structural barriers and inhibitors of purchasing foreign goods) that have always made it difficult to draw firm conclusions from comparing other trade friction cases.

Schoppa carries this creative design well. Using and expanding upon Robert Putnam's two-level-game analysis, he shows that these outcomes can be explained only by the simultaneous interaction of international negotiations and domestic politics. He elaborates upon various strategies and tactics (such as ''participation expansion,'' ''reverberation,'' ''synergistic linkage,'' and others) that can produce results at the bargaining table because they effectively combine with the opposing side's domestic politics. Then in a series of chapters on the different issue-area negotiations in SII and finally on the Clinton Framework talks, he shows how these were employed and were effective or not, and why.

The book is a major contribution to the literature on foreign economic policy making and U.S.–Japan relations. We have not had enough studies of U.S.–Japan trade friction, arguably one of the most important international political economic issues of the past two decades. Schoppa's work may be the most comprehensive, systematic, and heuristically valuable to date.

Nonetheless, there are a few inexplicable flaws and contradictions in the analysis. In his analysis of the Framework talks and in the conclusion, he argues forcefully for the impact of the end of the cold war leading Japanese bureaucrats and negotiators to stand up more forcefully to American demands. This argument seems especially misplaced and ad hoc given his own critique earlier in the book of simplistic approaches that cannot explain case variation. It does little to explain the differences in outcomes of cases both before and after the end of the cold war, and it is unsupported by a great deal of empirical evidence.

At another point, he argues against the notion advanced by scholars—myself and Simon Reich included—that the American president's role incorporates an ideology of free trade, citing such things as the Clinton attempt at ''results-oriented'' trade in the Framework talks as a counter-example (pp.76-78). This view ignores, however, the idea that Mac Destler and others have argued concerning the ''export politics'' of American trade politics in which the president attempts to open up foreign markets in order to prevent Congress from restricting imports. Since Schoppa himself shows how Bush initiated SII in part to prevent greater retaliation against Japan, it is strange that he sees a contradiction here, where none exists.

Despite these few problems, the book remains a creatively conceived and well conducted piece of theoretical and empirical research in an important area of international political economy.

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