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values that serves to engender opposition in poor as well as in wealthy nations. Whether this powerful motif translates into assaults on globalism being anti-Americanism, as a counter-symbol and counter-creed, is an idea that warrants further consideration.

By now, Brzezinski's penchant for identifying future trends and anticipating attributes has a track record. During the height of the Cold War, he envisioned the collapse of the Soviet Union under the sheer weight of impending ethnic and nationalities' burdens, *inter alia*. *Between Two Ages* (1970) anticipated what he termed the emerging "technetronic" or information era. *The Grand Chessboard* (1997) revisited Halford John MacKinder and should have prepared us for the turmoil at the southern extremities of the Eurasian landmass. On this basis alone, *The Choice* cannot but be taken seriously, and Brzezinski doesn't pull any punches. At the very outset, he asks, "Hegemony for the sake of what?" (p. x). He then proceeds to list over a dozen policy issues for which "a strategically comprehensive response" (p. x) is required and asserts that this new effort "is partially predictive and partially prescriptive" (p. xi). Indeed it is.

The Choice draws upon existing empirical evidence—this is a work of reflection—to provide a context for the complexity impinging upon the substance and conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The book is divided into five chapters, which take up the "dilemmas of national insecurity," "the new global disorder," "alliance management," "globalization," and "hegemonic democracy" (pp. v–vi). If Brzezinski remains one of the two primary influences on Condoleezza Rice's *Weltanschauung*, as she has previously allowed (the other being Hans Morgenthau), then he has provided her with an inclusive and nuanced vision of the disparate issues she needs to juggle, together with a strategic blueprint for action.

The image not easily dispelled is of the author peering down upon a large map of the world (not a chessboard, this time around), assessing and shuffling future capabilities about, highlighting geographical areas, and flagging issues to connote impending significance that U.S. statecraft had best not ignore. It is this expansive vision from the mountaintop—blurring detail and broad strokes—that is simultaneously appealing and bound to generate the most criticism. Once Brzezinski's ambitious framework is accepted, all flanks are protected by the seamless logic of his analysis and the careful reasoning of his conclusions. The distinction between global domination and global leadership, while not altogether clear-cut, is one that needs to be made, and Brzezinski has done so persuasively.

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The Politics of Executive Privilege *by Louis Fisher. Durham, NC, Carolina Academic Press, 2003. 288 pp. $42.00.*

The question of the constitutionality of executive privilege claims became a hot-button issue during the latter years of the Richard M. Nixon presidency, precipitating a political crisis that led first to the Supreme Court's ruling in *Nixon v. United States* and then to President Nixon's forced resignation. As

one by-product of the crisis, journalists and academics began to research the historical background of presidential efforts to withhold information from Congress. Their purpose was to understand the scope and legitimacy of the conflicting claims of presidents, members of Congress, and congressional committees. In a sense, Louis Fisher's *The Politics of Executive Privilege* can be considered the most recent addition to this literature. The Senior Specialist in separation of powers of the Library of Congress's Congressional Research Service, Fisher has both published extensively and testified before Congress on the issue of executive–legislative conflicts over access to information. His tightly reasoned, nuanced, and thoroughly researched monograph, however, shifts the focus of this debate. Fisher's masterful historical survey offers new insights and explores relatively unexamined cases wherein executive officials unsuccessfully sought to withhold information demanded by congressional committees. He both challenges exaggerated presidential claims and makes a compelling case for congressional oversight. In a series of thematic chapters, he explores how this conflict played out historically, citing numerous examples of executive officials ultimately agreeing, reversing an earlier constitutional claim, to honor congressional requests for specific records. He looks at Congress's ability to effect this reversal whether exercising subpoena, appointment, or impeachment powers; pursuing GAO investigations; commanding the testimony of White House aides; threatening contempt citations; or reviewing presidential foreign policy claims. At base, this history, Fisher posits in his introduction, requires an understanding of the "political settlements that decide most information disputes" (p. xv); thus, the aptness of his title, "the politics of executive privilege."

Fisher's impressive contribution serves to shift the focus of the debate over executive–legislative powers from the question of the constitutional boundaries between the executive and legislative branches to the specific circumstances and contexts influencing presidential withholding claims. He critically dissects the tortured reasoning underpinning specific rulings of Supreme Court justices (*Curtiss-Wright*, Watergate Tapes, Ameron, Pentagon Papers) and, more importantly, examines in depth numerous examples of executive–legislative conflict over information that did not reach the courts, primarily because of presidential acquiescence or compromise (Algerine and Jay treaties; Iran-Contra; Richard Kleindienst, William Rehnquist, the L. Patrick Gray III nomination; the Travelgate, Ashland, Inslaw, and FBI corruption in Boston affairs; and the David Mathews, Henry Kissinger, and Anne Gorsuch contempt citations). His thoroughly researched survey lends support for his concluding assessment: "Political understandings and settlements have kept executive–legislative conflicts over information to a manageable level. Legal and constitutional principles serve as guides, but no more than that. Attempts to announce precise boundaries between the two branches, indicating when Congress can and cannot have information, are not realistic or even desirable" (p. 259).

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