was as well no major opposition by the Republican Party to the extension of the Voting Rights Act in 2006. Concerning President Obama, they write that he has adopted a “mixed strategy” of advocating race-neutral policies while aggressively using anti-discrimination litigation to protect disadvantaged minority groups.

While somewhat critical of Obama, King and Smith conclude that racial progress is most probably achieved through a mix of strategies. A purely race-conscious or purely colorblind approach to policymaking cannot be sustained, they insist; it will only ignite public anger. While many readers will probably welcome a middle-ground approach resting on strong, historical work, others may not, preferring to sit in their own intellectual camp. One camp of scholars continues to disregard how racism and racial inequality were advanced and continue to be advanced in American laws and policies. Thus, the story told by King and Smith of black Congressman Arthur Mitchell suing after he was ejected from a sleeper car because of his race and winning in 1941 in a unanimous Supreme Court decision is not important to these types of scholars, who only see the exodus of conservative Southern white legislators to the GOP in the aftermath of civil rights legislation as the “end of racism.”

Race scholars will also insist that the racial system in America remains, despite the legacies of struggle that reinforced claims of pluralism and multiculturalism. America is organized still in a fashion that enables great economic mobility and social privilege for whites. Again, Mitchell’s role in Washington as a black elected official is either not very important or only important as his election both undermines and reinforces America’s racial order. The intellectual atmosphere thus remains hot. Hopefully, there will be an intellectually synergistic effect from the publication of Still a House Divided. As American politics scholars in these camps move forward, they might be able to see some working in the middle and refine their scholarship.

KATHERINE TATE
University of California, Irvine


The Constitution of the United States provides the federal government with 536 elected officials who come from 536 different electoral districts. David Mayhew asks whether this constitutional system is democratically fair. Given the 536 differently constituted and independent electoral bases, there is a real potential for what Mayhew labels both “dissonance” and “skew” in terms of which voters are represented by government activity.
Are the nation’s two parties impacted by this dissonance and skew? Is our constitutional system of representation that currently provides 536 districts, each differently drawn and geographically designed, unfairly benefitting one of the major national parties over the other?

Mayhew argues that although Republicans have benefited from this skew in the House and Senate in recent years, it is not by much and not of meaningful consequence. Contrasting vote shares by party in the electoral college, House, and Senate, with straight national popular vote shares in presidential elections, he finds only a slight 1.1 percent tilt Republican in the House, and a 1.3 percent tilt Republican in the Senate. This is one reason, he surmises, that the Constitution remains popular in America; neither party has reason to oppose its current system of representational distribution.

Mayhew then turns to the success that post-World War II presidents have had promoting their most important domestic legislative proposals. He analyzes 184 high-profile legislative debates to see if the slight tilt in Republican representation in the two houses has had an impact on legislative outcomes. Again, although he finds that to be possible, the evidence is at best ambiguous and does not come more dramatically from the House or the Senate.

Along the way, he provides many insights and empirical observations about the nation’s political system. He finds, for instance, that presidents tend to promote policies with “grand rationalizing schemes, whereas Congress is more at home with shapeless compromises agreeable to interest groups and geographic constituencies” (p. 59). The electoral college does not get in the way of the public will, the filibuster does not lead the Senate to be any more anti-majoritarian than the House, and small states are not grossly over-represented with federal money despite the representational biases in the Senate.

On the final page, he writes, “Representational symmetries across the parties have prevailed” (p. 190). In all, then, this is a quite positive book, published at a time when America’s current democracy has many vocal critics. These critics might ask whether partisan symmetries are the best measures of democratic representation. What would be gained if more attention were paid to the many millions of Americans—often constituting a majority themselves—who do not vote, or the range of issues that neither party raises in Congress because of agenda setting or interest group skew? Has the meaning of Democrats versus Republicans in an era of great inequality and hyper-corporate influence changed while the symmetries have remained? How do we make sense of the politics currently taking place outside of lawmaking, including the consistent failures to confirm judges and executive officials, or the move by both parties to litigate their partisan debate?

Mayhew admits his story is “narrow and circumscribed” (p. 189), and perhaps these questions are left for another book. In the meantime, he
has provided much for political scientists to grapple with. Typical of a David Mayhew contribution, this book is detailed and meticulous in its analysis, impeccably written and argued, and provides a range of thoughtful, provocative, and counter-intuitive claims. It is a worthy addition to Mayhew’s esteemed cannon.

PAUL FRYMER
Princeton University


Paul Pillar is an author with a mission. The book’s strengths, of which there are many, and the weaknesses, of which there are some, emanate from that sense of purpose.

Intelligence is one of the relatively under-studied areas of American foreign policy. We have the excellent work of scholars such as Robert Jervis, Richard Betts, and Loch Johnson, as well as some valuable studies from policy practitioners and think tanks. As someone with extensive professional experience as a senior intelligence officer as well as prior academic training and recent professoring, Pillar is well positioned to provide an integrative perspective on the intelligence–foreign policy relationship.

His main argument is that “policy has shaped intelligence more than vice versa” (p. 5). One main reason connects to literature on perceptions (for example, Jervis) and belief systems (for example, Alexander George and Ole and Kal Holsti) and how information is filtered and refracted by pre-set images and beliefs and accompanying premises held and assumptions made. The other main reason is politicization, both explicit and more-subtle. Not only is the book’s longest chapter titled Politicization, but instances of blatant pressure on intelligence officers, inconvenient analyses being ignored or distorted, and more-subtle and arguably more-insidious politicizations come through throughout the book.

The book is historical in scope, with cases including the Korean War, Vietnam, and the Soviet threat. In each case, Pillar argues that too much blame was heaped on intelligence failures, too little on policy and political failures. At times, he takes this too far, as in drawing the cross-case conclusion that the intelligence community’s (IC’s) input into major strategic decisions has been “almost nil” (p. 120); even with the “almost” qualifier, the critique is over-stated.

The main focus, as the subtitle conveys, is on the Iraq war and September 11. On Iraq, he adds importantly, given his first-hand knowledge, to the critique