Wolf. Senator Robert Taft is a particularly unsung hero in this tale, for he was, at the least, wholly lacking in hypocrisy. Conversely, “No American better exemplifies the vicissitudes of globalism and its impact on basic liberties than Richard Nixon,” he writes (p. 132). Like-minded predecessors notwithstanding, Walker’s exploration of the colonial, eighteenth-century, and nineteenth-century origins and meanings of these values is particularly nuanced and well-researched. He elegantly documents that the American desire to preserve liberty at home, largely through expansion of economic opportunity abroad, which, in turn, led to greater security risks, was functionally the same in the eighteenth century as in the twenty-first century. These chapters are of great use. They demonstrate a historian at the top of his craft, fully immersed in his subject, and fully abreast of the relevant (and recent) literature.

Subsequent chapters, however, in particular those that demonstrate a litany (Walker’s word) of American transgressions against those core values, fail to meet the work’s initial high standard. The book transforms over these pages from history to lament, describing in detail the depth of American depravity, which Nixon exemplified but from which no recent policymaker is spared. Americans have fallen from grace, he argues, because they have disregarded what made them exceptional in the first place. “Since their nation’s founding,” he concludes in one of a myriad of similar invectives, “American citizens have steadfastly believed that the vitality of basic values depended on individual and collective prosperity. George W. Bush’s years in power negated that presumptive bond.” Such critiques will no doubt be of use to future scholars interested in documenting the public angst produced by the Bush years. Walker’s insights work best when describing the past, which he knows well, rather than the present, in which his critiques are no less valid, but, simultaneously, not unique.

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Rebels Without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics

The current war in Afghanistan shows the importance of cross-border insurgency, as the Taliban are fueled by recruits, funds, and sanctuary in Pakistan. Idean Salehyan’s book offers a well-designed and clearly executed study of a pressing topic. Salehyan argues that “transnational rebels” (TNRs) pose a unique set of challenges, making civil conflict more likely and enduring, while also contributing to international conflict (p. 6).

The first claim, about the onset and duration of civil wars, is grounded in the argument that transnational connections, to state sponsors, diasporas, and/or sanctuaries, can provide opportunities for collective action and mobilization that would otherwise be absent. Neighboring territory is especially useful to
rebels. In addition to providing mobilization opportunities, transnational opposition increases the level of uncertainty facing states and rebels as they bargain over a settlement. This leads Salehyan to make two basic claims. First, states that are faced with TNRs (especially provided by neighboring rivals or weak states) will be more likely to experience civil conflict. Second, wars involving TNRs will last longer, since learning about the balance of power and committing to particular policies in this context are more difficult.

Salehyan tests these claims using quantitative methods, examining both conflict incidence and duration. He finds generally, though not universally, strong support for his argument—rivalries with neighbors contribute to the continuation of conflict, neighboring civil conflicts make a country more likely to experience its own civil war, and wars with TNRs last longer on average. He also finds that ethnic groups close to borders are more likely to rebel.

The book then shifts to the international dimensions of TNRs, testing the claim that countries with external rebel bases are more likely to enter into conflict with the rebels’ home country. Using the level of militarized interstate disputes between countries, Salehyan finds support for the argument. There is some evidence of a substitution effect as well, however—states that support rebels against a neighbor may be less likely to use actual violence against the neighboring state.

This set of quantitative studies is bolstered by case narratives, some of which are very short and others (on Nicaragua and Rwanda) longer. They act to confirm that some of the mechanisms suggested in the theory are at work in actual cases. They are also more helpful than the statistics in studying dynamics of bargaining in the midst of conflict.

Salehyan has written a persuasive and useful book that will be an important resource for scholars of civil war. There are, however, two aspects of the work that could have been improved. First, it is not clear that the results presented are particularly surprising. The argument that transnational support helps rebels has been part of the conventional wisdom since Algeria and Vietnam (for instance, Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority in 1970), and has informed contemporary debates and scholarship about Congo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The role of TNRs in fueling interstate conflict has been studied extensively in the context of India–Pakistan and Lebanon, among others.

Second, the case narratives, while useful, could have taken fuller advantage of the possibilities of tightly controlled comparisons and process evidence. The Nicaragua and Rwanda cases are mainly used to trace out the theory, but the regional contexts in which they were occurring could have been plumbed for variation across time and space to show the differential effects of TNRs. More detail on the actual internal decision-making processes of both states and rebels would have significantly improved Salehyan’s claims about bargaining dynamics.

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