from a Beijing research institute affiliated with China’s military, offers a valuable Chinese perspective on the range of disputes in the East Asian littoral, including the South China Sea. In Zhang’s view—one widely held in China—the United States is a troublesome meddler. Another chapter by U.S. academics Danielle Cohen and Jonathan Kirshner challenges widely held suppositions about energy security. Using an array of data, they make a persuasive case that two interrelated assumptions about energy are dangerous myths: first, that there is a global shortage of energy; and second, that state action can remedy the problem. Together, these myths—which the authors collectively dub a “cult of energy insecurity”—raise interstate tensions and exacerbate existing problems.

There are a number of other fine chapters on an array of topics, including a fascinating one by Taylor Fravel that seeks to explain the Chinese military’s recent interest in non-combat operations. Another chapter, by Michael Horowitz, examines the security impact of regional economic integration. The findings of these two scholars will probably surprise many readers.

This volume deserves wide distribution and should be required reading for all scholars and practitioners who focus on international relations in East Asia. Moreover, the book is very appropriate and most timely as a text for graduate and advanced undergraduate courses on East Asian security.

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Having elsewhere assessed the structural forces that shaped America’s rise to global power, Joseph Nye now turns to the personal elements. What role, he asks, did individuals, in particular presidents, play in the twentieth-century emergence of the United States as the arbiter of world affairs? Nye finds wanting the existing literature on presidential leadership as overemphasizing “transformational” presidents and blurring the line between presidential ethics and presidential efficacy.

Nye focuses on eight presidents. Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson presided over the early growth of American power; Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower consolidated American power; Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush completed the conquest of Soviet communism and established the United States as the world’s sole superpower. While conceding the difficulty of his task, Nye attempts to tease out the contribution each president made to the development and
maintenance of American power, distinct from the contributions of other individuals and contextual forces. The basic question in each case is: What did this president accomplish that a different individual in the White House at this time would not have accomplished?

Nye gives less credit to Theodore Roosevelt than TR usually gets; in Nye’s view, context and structure explain most of what happened in American foreign policy in the first decade of the twentieth century. Taft didn’t matter much, either. Wilson’s personal impact was large, though, in the short term, in the opposite direction from that which he intended. The reaction against Wilson’s internationalist vision produced the isolationism of the interwar years; only after the failure of isolationism did Wilson’s vision take hold. Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower each made a difference beyond what the structure of forces would have predicted, Nye says. By contrast, most of what Reagan and the first Bush accomplished would have been achieved by almost anyone who was president during the 1980s and early 1990s; the end of the Cold War resulted primarily from developments within the Soviet Union.

Nye proposes a new framework for assessing presidents. In place of the transformational/transactional dyad, he proposes four categories: transformational objectives with inspirational style, transformational objectives with transactional style, incremental objectives with inspirational style, and incremental objectives with transactional style. The categories are more easily illustrated than explained. Wilson is the model of the first, Truman of the second, Eisenhower of the third, Bill Clinton of the fourth.

Nye’s taxonomy is helpful up to a point. He himself admits the obvious: the model is simply a model, no president fits any of the categories precisely. Even so, many readers will skip some of the categorizing in favor of the insightful capsule summaries of his presidents’ foreign policies.

Nye devotes his longest chapter to the ethics of foreign policy leadership. Here he lays out six categories, crossing ethics and efficacy on one axis, with goals, means, and consequences on the other. He scores each of his eight presidents, with Theodore Roosevelt rating poorly on means (tolerating atrocities in the Philippine war, wresting Panama from Colombia), Franklin Roosevelt favorably on goals and consequences (defeating fascism), and Truman and H.W. Bush best of all (Truman for designing and implementing containment, Bush for completing it).

Nye’s book originated in a course he has taught, and it bears the thought-provoking marks of a stimulating advanced class. Readers will have to bring their own knowledge of his presidents if they are to get the most out of his observations; the modest length of the book precludes significant detail.

At the end, Nye extrapolates from the past to offer guidance to presidents in the future. His counsel is unsurprising, the gist being that as the rest of the

In this journalist’s history of the second golden age of counterinsurgency, Fred Kaplan recounts the struggles of counterinsurgency advocates to convince a skeptical military and civilian leadership of their ability to restore order in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is a faithful chronicler of interested parties, an heir to the tradition of Polybius and Josephus. As in any work of this kind, he is a prisoner of his sources. The result is a story that is clearer than truth, a fitting but largely uncritical summary of the “COINdinistas”’ case.

This reliance on the testimony of his subjects obscures the Machiavellian genius of the advocates, first among them General David Petraeus. He and his disciples convinced many of their fellow warriors of the Hippocratic imperative of counterinsurgency: first, do no harm. But Petraeus’s true genius lay in his ability to co-opt skeptics inside and outside the military. His courtship of academics, non-governmental organizations, and pundits bought him leverage in the bureaucratic battles inside the military and preempted or at least postponed the criticisms of academia. His sense of timing contributed more directly to the dramatic turn in Iraq; there, his willingness to ignore his own doctrine and push money and weapons to the turned insurgents of the Awakening was in keeping with his audacity and mastery of closed politics.

While the book traces the development of the new doctrine, it does little to assess its validity. In both wars, there was at best a loose relationship between U.S. efforts to improve security, governance, and development and the process of state consolidation. Protecting the population and hunting down the “irreconcilables” undoubtedly suppressed violence in Iraq and areas of Afghanistan. The problems with the strategy were its cost and the absence of a termination mechanism. Removing U.S. troops or reducing U.S. payments to local self-defense forces rekindled violent competition for power. Unpaid proxies sought new employers while host governments shied away from funding irregular forces that might challenge their authority. In the end, U.S. forces...