Why Trump Won’t Retrench: The Militarist Redoubt in American Foreign Policy

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AT THE TIME OF HIS INAUGURATION, it appeared plausible that President Donald J. Trump would deliver the most dramatic shifts in U.S. foreign relations at least since the September 11 terror attacks, probably since the end of the Cold War, and perhaps even—in some important respects—since World War II. As a candidate for office, after all, Trump had made no secret of his disdain for the organizing principles of U.S. foreign policy. He took particular aim at the great edifice of U.S. internationalism, styling himself as an unapologetic nationalist whose “America First” approach to foreign affairs compared favorably with the perfidious “globalism” of his political opponents.1 According to Trump, the U.S.-led international order and the bipartisan foreign policies designed to buttress that order had been ruinous for ordinary Americans. By implication, generations of U.S. leaders had been wrong—unpatriotic and traitorous, even—to dedicate so much of the nation’s blood and treasure to upholding what is, at its core, an unjust and injurious international system. A new foreign policy was needed, Trump insisted—one that would put America’s


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relations with the outside world on terms more obviously conducive to the national interest.

Is the United States entering a period of wide-ranging strategic retrenchment now that an avowed anti-internationalist occupies the White House? Even if not, has Trump’s presidency at least opened the door to isolationist ideas, policies, and practices reentering the political mainstream? Or will liberal internationalism ultimately prove resilient to the challenge of America First? In this article, I approach these questions by placing domestic support for U.S. internationalism in historical context. I argue that since World War II, the United States has conducted an activist foreign policy because of two enduring beliefs: that multilateral security partnerships are essential to defeating and deterring foreign threats to U.S. national security, and that domestic prosperity depends upon the existence of an open world economy, which, in turn, requires the unstinting application of U.S. power abroad. President Trump and his supporters accept neither of these justifications for overseas engagement. Since the 1950s, however, a third pillar has emerged to support the postwar foreign policy superstructure: a pronounced militarist bias in U.S. government and politics. On this front, the Trump administration presents no threat whatsoever to prevailing internationalist orthodoxies. If anything, the Trump presidency looks set to deepen America’s attachment to militarist norms and military statecraft.2 This militarist redoubt in U.S. politics will ensure that the United States continues to wage an activist foreign policy even in the context of eroding support for the liberal international order and even if the Trump administration fails to articulate new “grand plans”3 for U.S. power and influence.

This argument about the future of America’s world role has several implications. First, Trump’s militaristic brand of foreign policy is a reminder that a strategy of international activism is not contingent upon support for the liberal international architecture. While the two have tended to coincide for the past seven decades, Trump’s presidency is demonstrating in real time that the United States can remain fully engaged in world politics, particularly in the military sphere, even if it opts not to harness its power in the service of liberal internationalist ends. Second, Trump’s foreign policies to date help reveal that America’s global

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footprint has evolved since the World War II era to assume a (militarist) logic all of its own. Expansive overseas commitments are not at the sole behest of liberal internationalists but also command the support of leaders like Trump who view militarism as an asset in domestic politics. This militarist bias in domestic politics cuts against meaningful retrenchment in foreign affairs. Finally, the argument that U.S. foreign policy is driven in large part by a domestic impulsion toward military power projection implies that no matter how far Trump might succeed at undercutting U.S. leadership (legitimate authority) in international affairs, his time in office is unlikely to augur an American recessional from the world stage. For while Trump looks certain to implement a brand of overseas activism much different from that of his predecessors, his is a form of internationalism nonetheless—pugilistic, militaristic, unilateralist, often disjointed, and at times decidedly illiberal, but still focused on the broad-based exercise of U.S. power and influence abroad.

THREE PILLARS OF U.S. INTERNATIONALISM
For over seven decades, proponents of internationalist policies in the United States have relied upon the triumph of three intersubjective beliefs about national purpose: that programmatic overseas engagement leads to national security, that the U.S.-led open world economy creates domestic prosperity, and that the size of the U.S. military is positively correlated with national well-being. As noted earlier, the first and second of these beliefs became widely accepted following the attack on Pearl Harbor and the experience of World War II. The third belief became a fixture of the U.S. political system some decades later. In what follows, I place these beliefs in historical context, sketching their origins and noting their antitheses in national political conversation.

National and International Security
The attack on Pearl Harbor marks the moment after which the United States began to prosecute a foreign policy of expansive overseas engagement in the name of ensuring national and international security. Even to former isolationists, the lessons of December 1941 seemed clear: that two great oceans and unthreatening neighbors were insufficient to secure the United States from foreign threats, that events on other continents could not be kept at arm’s length, and that defeating America’s

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enemies abroad was preferable to suffering assaults on the homeland. Prior to Pearl Harbor, there had been significant disagreement over the wisdom of international engagement (especially military interventionism) beyond the Western Hemisphere. The Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor was a critical juncture that resolved this long-running debate over national defense in favor of those who urged a more activist foreign policy. In the words of Senator Arthur Vandenberg, “our oceans have ceased to be moats which automatically protect our ramparts.”

Yet even if it was inevitable that the United States would declare war against the Axis powers in response to Pearl Harbor, it was not assured that the country would pursue a leading role in global affairs once the war was over. The traditional U.S. approach had always been to demobilize following a major conflict. To be sure, it was nothing new for the United States to deploy its forces abroad during peacetime. Nor was it novel for a U.S. administration to contemplate how to construct a just international settlement in the wake of a major war. But America’s overseas presence in the late 1940s and early 1950s would be of a qualitatively different sort than anything seen in previous decades: a vast network of permanent military bases on foreign soil, hundreds of thousands of troops stationed abroad, formal guarantees of security to foreign nations, billions of dollars in overseas aid, massive investments in international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank, support (albeit uneven) for universal human rights, and the generous provision of global public goods. This array of voluntary commitments was revolutionary in scope—an emphatic repudiation of America’s customary avoidance of foreign entanglements.

Throughout the Cold War, U.S. presidents hewed to the calculation that national security depended upon the preservation of favorable

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international conditions. For the most part, the broader polity (including public opinion) also remained supportive of an expansive global role, especially with regard to containing the Soviet Union and its communist allies, even if there were those who criticized the militarist bent that U.S. foreign policy and domestic society seemed to be taking. Early on, Robert Taft led Republican opposition against the Harry S. Truman administration’s efforts to put the United States and its allies on a permanent war footing, while on the left, Henry Wallace advocated mended relations with the Soviet Union and sought to style himself as a “peace candidate” in the 1948 election. Around the same time, the political scientist Harold Lasswell found a receptive audience when he cautioned against the United States becoming a “garrison state,” and the influential journalist Walter Lippman tapped into a vein of national anxiety about the militarization of U.S. society when he warned of an impending “cold war.” Even President Dwight D. Eisenhower famously used his Farewell Address to caution against the influence of a creeping “military-industrial complex.” But for the most part, the experiences of the early Cold War period—Soviet adventurism in Eastern Europe, Moscow’s acquisition of the atomic bomb, the onset of the Korean War—forged a lasting consensus about how to organize grand strategy. While the precise formula for dealing with the Soviets would vary from administration to administration, no White House after Truman’s seriously contemplated that the United States could be secure without a large, forward-deployed military establishment and a network of credible alliance commitments, especially in Western Europe and East Asia.

If the security exigencies of the Cold War era kept something of a lid on anti-internationalist sentiment, then the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union might easily have led to a resurgence of calls for retrenchment. Indeed, maximalists such as

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Charles Krauthammer feared exactly such a scenario, warning that in time, the abundant international security afforded by America’s “unipolar moment” would lull domestic actors into (erroneously) viewing overseas engagement as unsuited to a new and more benign external environment.\textsuperscript{15} True enough, critics of internationalism were eager to make a renewed case against overseas entanglement in the early post–Cold War period. On the right, Pat Buchanan took up the old Republican standards of anti-interventionism and economic protectionism while, from the left, Paul Tsongas and other Democrats waged populist campaigns for retrenchment.\textsuperscript{16} But these assaults on U.S. internationalism had limited effect. While most congressional Democrats voted against the first Gulf War, for example, the ultimate popularity of that war served as a powerful reminder that a preponderance of the U.S. public still believed that even in a post–Cold War context, global leadership and military primacy were important pillars of national security.\textsuperscript{17}

Perhaps predictably, the belief that U.S. national security depended upon a benign international environment (and the corollary that such placid environs could best be ensured through the projection of military power) was strengthened still further after the events of 11 September 2001. For President Bush and his cabinet, at least, September 11 laid bare the lessons of Pearl Harbor once more—namely, that the United States could not exit the world stage even if it wanted to, and that bold foreign and defense policies were required to prevent the emergence of potential threats.\textsuperscript{18} George W. Bush ran for office in 2000 on a platform of opposing “nation-building” (understood by contemporaries to be a euphemism for military interventionism), and at the time of his election, he was not an obvious candidate for greatly expanding America’s military presence abroad.\textsuperscript{19} After September 11, however, major criticisms of interventionism receded from the public square. The invasion of Afghanistan went almost unquestioned in mainstream U.S. politics and, in short order, neo-Reaganites in the Bush administration convinced the president, a majority of the political class, and most ordinary Americans that regime

\textsuperscript{18}George W. Bush, \textit{Decision Points} (New York: Broadway, 2010), chap. 5.
change was necessary in Iraq too. More broadly, Bush embraced “perpetual primacy” as an ambition to orient U.S. foreign policy and sanctioned Donald Rumsfeld’s efforts at the Department of Defense to transform the U.S. military into a fighting force that would face no peer competitor for the foreseeable future.

By and large, then, the idea that overseas activism is a necessary pillar of national security has been firmly entrenched in the U.S. foreign policymaking establishment from 1941 to the present day. Whereas the 1930s had been characterized by vigorous disagreements over defense policy, Pearl Harbor and the experience of World War II decisively resolved those debates in favor of the maximalists. Challenges to this viewpoint have periodically resurfaced—especially with regards to the correct balance between unilateralism and multilateralism—but they have never succeeded in upending the broad internationalist consensus. The result has been a long-standing pattern of U.S. activism in world affairs. Even a president like Barack Obama, whose political instincts were to eschew transformative foreign policies in favor of a focus on domestic renewal, ultimately found it expedient to expand the U.S. military effort in Afghanistan, dramatically increase the use of drone strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and elsewhere, work with European partners to engineer regime change in Libya, augment U.S. forces in Eastern Europe in the face of Russian aggression, send thousands of additional troops to Iraq in response to the rise of the Islamic State, arm antigovernment rebels in Syria, and bolster America’s alliances in East Asia as a way to hedge against the rise of China—all in the name of ensuring an international environment favorable to national security. In this sense, at least, Obama was like each of his predecessors since Franklin D. Roosevelt: a security-seeking internationalist.

What makes this modern history of overseas military engagement “internationalist” is the extent to which the United States has acted in concert with its allies. The United States has more formal (treaty) allies

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than any other country, in addition to a host of informal security arrangements. These partnerships range from codified collective security pacts to agreements on basing rights to intelligence sharing and cooperation over military technology. Today, the NATO alliance and America’s bilateral relationships with countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia stand out as some of the most important anchors of the global security architecture. Of course, the United States has not always channeled its military power through the fabric of multilateral institutions—as Sarah Kreps notes, U.S. leaders have conspicuously “reserved the privilege of unilateral use of force”\(^\text{23}\)—but the empirical record does support the notion that the United States has, to a large extent, preferred multilateral interventions over unilateral actions and, moreover, that the trend has been toward greater multilateralism, not less.\(^\text{24}\)

**America and the World Economy**

Just as the United States in the 1930s was divided over the proper scope of defense policy, so, too, was the country torn on the question of how to engage with the world economy. On one side stood those whose economic interests were tied to policies of free trade, overseas investment, and international cooperation. These groups pushed for the United States to adopt a proactive role in shaping world economic structures for fear that otherwise, hostile powers would organize to deprive U.S. firms of lucrative overseas opportunities. On the other side were economic nationalists who wanted protection against imports and sought to steer the federal government toward a focus on the home front.\(^\text{25}\)

Prior to World War II, these rival blocs exerted influence over different parts of the foreign policy bureaucracy, resulting in a rough stalemate in Washington, DC.\(^\text{26}\) Beyond the capital, however, the interwar years saw shifting alignments in U.S. politics. From 1919 to 1933, the White House and both chambers of Congress were controlled by a Republican Party anchored in the agrarian West and industrial Northeast, regions that tended to return legislators committed to limiting the role of the federal government in foreign economic policy. But over the course of the period,

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\(^{25}\)Peter Trubowitz, *Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), chap. 3.

the economic health of the Northeast gradually became much more dependent upon engagement with the world economy and, as a result, northern lawmakers began to take a keener interest in the preservation of an open international order. With the Democrats’ landslide election victory in 1932, this shift in northeastern interests became pivotal: the legislative branch of the U.S. government was now dominated by a Democratic coalition of northeastern and southern lawmakers who urged President Roosevelt to pursue an “open door” international policy in the face of creeping autarky from the likes of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan.27

The experience of World War II shifted the balance of power in U.S. domestic politics even further in favor of economic internationalists. With the economies of Europe and Asia in ruins, even U.S. corporations that had struggled to compete in the prewar international economy found themselves peerless in the postwar context. According to Richard Nelson and Gavin Wright, “the United States came out of [World War II] buoyant, with technological capabilities extended by wartime production experience, while Europe came out prostrate.” Even once America’s prewar competitors began to recover in the early postwar period, “the U.S. productivity and income edge remained enormous.”28 Protectionist interests were reduced to a rump and, almost by default, internationalist ideas and policies flooded the national agenda.

What economic internationalists demanded most of all were policies to orchestrate the reconstitution of the world economy—that is, a foreign economic policy aimed at rebuilding an external environment that would allow the United States to press its economic advantages and reap the benefits of international commerce.29 In practice, this meant economic and military aid to friendly (capitalist) nations, defensive alliances to deter Soviet aggression and preserve the most important nodes of the capitalist world economy, participation in international organizations such as the UN, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, IMF, and World Bank, and undertakings to police the global commons. The belief was that without the application of U.S. power to promote the revival of a functioning international economy, it would be impossible for foreign states to engage in the profitable commercial relationships that U.S. firms depended upon. From this view, an open international economy was well worth paying for.

27Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest, chap. 3.
Beyond economic self-interest, U.S. leaders had political and security reasons for wanting to consolidate an open international economy, chief among which was the goal of organizing an international coalition to oppose communist expansion. This strategic justification for pursuing economic interdependence helps to explain why the United States was willing to offer such generous concessions to foreign governments that would agree to liberalize their economies.\textsuperscript{30} It warrants emphasis, however, that America’s postwar economic internationalism was largely an elite-driven phenomenon.\textsuperscript{31} While the anticommunist security rationale for containing the Soviet Union made intuitive sense to most Americans, there was hardly a groundswell of domestic support for rebuilding the economies of foreign nations— especially not those of former adversaries. Instead, it was U.S. leaders along with their counterparts in allied capitals who articulated a connection between a flourishing international economy, anticommunism, and domestic prosperity. These elites sought to put in place an international economic system that would engender long-term political support for freer trade and economic cooperation and guard against a return to the destructive policies of the Great Depression era or, worse still, a turn to anticapitalist economic planning. The result was an arrangement—the Bretton Woods compromise—that balanced the creation of a market-based economic bloc in the West with explicit allowances for Western governments to temporarily “opt out” of deep economic integration in response to severe domestic hardships caused by greater interdependence.\textsuperscript{32}

In the United States, exposure to an open international economy was beneficial neither to all sectors of the U.S. economy nor to all regions of the country. As a result, successive U.S. administrations indulged calls for what John Ruggie called “the new protectionism,”\textsuperscript{33} albeit usually in spirit of preserving a wider domestic consensus in favor of international economic cooperation. This was especially true as the competitive edge enjoyed


\textsuperscript{33}Ruggie, “International Regimes,” 405, 410.
by U.S. industries began to wane in the 1960s. And, of course, it was President Richard M. Nixon’s decision to take the United States off the gold standard—a move motivated by domestic political considerations—that signaled the demise of the Bretton Woods monetary system. But the residual calculation (or presumption) of most modern political leaders has been that, on balance, a liberal world economy is in the overall interests of the United States and so it is right and proper that U.S. power is devoted to the maintenance of such an international environment. Indeed, without the widespread perception that internationalism pays handsome dividends for both corporate America and the country at large, the strategy of deep overseas engagement would have fallen by the wayside as soon as the United States had avenged the attack on Pearl Harbor. But because so many sectors of the U.S. economy did (and still do) benefit from internationalist foreign policies, it became conventional wisdom for over 70 years that liberal order building served the U.S. national interest and not just a collection of parochial or elite interests privately invested in the internationalist project.

**Automating Internationalism: The National Security State**

The preceding discussion has painted the period from 1941 to 1950 as a turning point during which two long-standing debates in U.S. politics—one over defense policy and over economic policy—were resolved in favor of groups who advocated for an expansive global role. Implementing the internationalists’ designs has required the United States to maintain a gargantuan military establishment. Today, the U.S. military can count over 1.3 million active-duty personnel among its ranks; during the Cold War, the number never dipped below two million. America’s nuclear stockpile topped 30,000 warheads in the 1960s and still comprises over 4,000 weapons, more than 1,400 of which are deployed on delivery systems at any given time. Both the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy are the largest

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37Stein, “The Hegemon’s Dilemma.”
and most technologically advanced of their kind with an unparalleled capacity to project power on every continent and in each of the world’s oceans. The United States maintains hundreds of military bases on foreign soil in addition to over 4,000 domestic installations—a sprawling complex of barracks, airbases, naval stations, communications facilities, missile sites, and other types of military real estate that dot the landscapes of the United States, its territories, and allied countries.41

This vast militarist enterprise has transformed the political economy and political culture of the United States. During World War II, America’s industrial heartlands were put to work in service of producing the military means necessary to triumph over the Axis powers.42 Although arms manufacturing declined precipitously after 1945, the United States embarked upon a wide-ranging rearmament program following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.43 Defense spending remained high for the next four decades, with much of industrial America being made dependent upon—and, indeed, made out of—the huge federal outlays for national defense.44 By the end of the Cold War, no fewer than six million workers (fully 5 percent of the U.S. workforce) were employed by defense contractors or the Department of Defense.45 As of 2016, the defense sector continued to contribute an estimated 4.1 million jobs to the U.S. economy, either directly or indirectly, in addition to those employed by the military itself.46 Each year, billions of taxpayers’ dollars pour into geographic spaces that are home to weapons manufacturers and military bases, supporting millions of jobs and providing stable tax bases for state and local governments. According to 2015 report by RAND, the U.S. Army alone spends $121 million per year in the median congressional district, creating an average of 4,200 jobs.47 This means that elected representatives are

43Block, “Economic Instability and Military Strength.”
47Christopher M. Schnaubelt et al., The Army’s Local Economic Effects (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), x.
understandably reluctant to mandate cuts to the federal defense budget; for many of them, reductions in military spending are simply at odds with the economic interests of their constituents. Despite President Eisenhower’s warning nearly 60 years ago, the “military-industrial complex” is now a basic fact of American political economy.

It would be wrong to reduce U.S. militarism to the economic self-interest of arms manufacturers, military and civilian bureaucrats, and elected officials, however. The reality is that militarism has a powerful normative component to it—and that since the Cold War, support for the military has become tightly woven into the fabric of U.S. political culture. Popular affinity for the armed forces is perhaps unsurprising given the remaking of American political geography that occurred over the course of the Cold War, with entire communities being transformed by—and, as noted above, being made dependent upon—the defense sector.48 Indeed, the emergence of a “garrison state” in the U.S. context has, in no small measure, been a bottom-up process led by people whose everyday lives are defined by routine (positive) interactions with an omnipresent military establishment.49 This is true even as fewer people per capita now serve in the military compared with previous eras. Especially after September 11, few corners of U.S. politics and society have been left untouched by notions of the essential goodness (and Americanness) of the military.50 While opposition to a powerful central government used to be a core component of U.S. national identity, distrust of a permanent peacetime military became hard to maintain once so much of domestic society was made intimately familiar with military efforts to “secure” the nation.

One result of militarism’s grip on U.S. politics is that internationalist foreign policies have become somewhat automatic. Even if there is not

always consensus on how to use military force, there is widespread agreement that military power per se is a good thing and that a large military establishment is sacrosanct. U.S. leaders are compelled to laud the country’s military footprint and find rhetorical justifications for its existence. Consider, for example, President Obama’s 2009 speech made in acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize—an occasion more accustomed to liberal idealism than the tenets of militarism. “I’m responsible for the deployment of thousands of young Americans to battle in a distant land,” Obama began, appearing to disclose an idealist’s unhappiness with war. “Some will kill, and some will be killed. And so I come here with an acute sense of the costs of armed conflict—filled with difficult questions about the relationship between war and peace, and our effort to replace one with the other.” But as Obama’s speech wore on, it became clear that the president intended to use his disquisition to justify, not lament, the continued existence of U.S. militarism:

In many countries there is a deep ambivalence about military action today, no matter what the cause. And at times, this is joined by a reflexive suspicion of America, the world’s sole military superpower. But the world must remember that it was not simply international institutions—not just treaties and declarations—that brought stability to a post-World War II world. Whatever mistakes we have made, the plain fact is this: The United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms. The service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans.

In other words, Obama was saying, U.S. military force and the willingness to use it have been essential to the preservation of international tranquility since World War II. “We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will,” he insisted. “We have done so out of enlightened self-interest—because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if others’ children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity.”

This sentiment—that the U.S. military is an essential tool in the service of peace, security, and the pursuit of happiness for all humankind—has become a cardinal truth that Americans and their leaders tell of themselves.

Originally, America’s militarist turn after World War II was meant to serve the security and economic ends outlined above. But it would be wrong to confuse the continued exercise of U.S. military power abroad with American support for liberal internationalist strictures. This was a mistake that some made of the Bush administration, for example, which pursued an obviously militaristic foreign policy after September 11. In the words of one commentator in the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, Bush was “the most Wilsonian president since Wilson himself.”

This portrayal of Bush as a liberal internationalist was based solely on his willingness to use military force in the service of idealism. It ignored Bush’s forceful rejection (or sidelining) of key multilateral institutions such as the Kyoto Protocol, Rome Statute, UN, and, in the case of the Iraq War, even NATO—a tour de force in unilateralism that betrayed growing opposition to the liberal international order within the Bush administration, in Congress, and among the electorate at large. The reality is that Bush was not a leader squarely in the Wilsonian tradition of U.S. foreign policy; he also drew inspiration from the “Jacksonian tradition” that was then resurgent inside the Republican Party. At least in this narrow sense, Bush can be considered something of a forerunner of Trump: a leader who discounted the link between national security and participation in multilateral institutions but who nevertheless kept the United States deeply engaged in international affairs via a policy of aggressive militarism, the latter (militarist) element of his foreign policy often obscuring the former (antiliberal internationalist) component.

THE CHALLENGE OF “AMERICA FIRST”

President Trump’s “America First” foreign policy takes aim at two of the three aforementioned ideational pillars of U.S. internationalism—that is, the twin (liberal) beliefs that expansive overseas engagement makes America safer and more prosperous. But neither Trump’s pronouncements on foreign policy nor his actions in office have done anything to diminish domestic backing for militarism. Instead, support for militarism is one of the primary policy positions that unites the Trump administration and Republican lawmakers, and it is a core element of the president’s public

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persona and electoral appeal. Trump’s penchant for militarism sits uneasily alongside his broader criticisms of the internationalist project and places limits on his ambitions to refashion some of the costliest aspects of U.S. foreign policy. Simply put, it is difficult to be against overseas engagement but in favor of military statecraft at the same time.

**America Alone**

One of Trump’s most powerful criticisms of the U.S.-led international order is that instead of keeping America safe, it has served to benefit America’s top-tier competitors and thus make the international system more dangerous than it otherwise might have been. Although exaggerated by Trump, there is some truth to this claim: instead of pursuing a strategy of domination over other world powers, U.S. policy since 1945 has been calibrated to provide other countries with wealth, power, and security—albeit selectively.55 Even U.S. policy toward its vanquished rivals in World War II did not remain punitive for long; by 1950, the United States was implementing measures that were unambiguously designed to bolster West Germany and Japan’s wealth and power, including their industrial and military capabilities, in order to augment the aggregate might of the anticommmunist bloc in international politics. Neither was this pattern of promoting the rise in power of friendly nations confined to the Cold War period. The United States supported German reunification in 1990,56 for example, and has long backed the political and economic integration of (Western) Europe,57 thus guaranteeing the existence of a more or less consolidated geopolitical power on the other side of the Atlantic. And although the United States did press its military advantages against post-Soviet Russia to some extent,58 U.S. leaders combined such actions with steps to integrate Moscow into the liberal order through the provision of economic aid and invitations to join Western institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and G-8.

Today, this strategy of accepting (if not outright promoting) the relative rise in power of other nations is most evident in U.S. policy toward China, a country with the obvious potential to outstrip the United States and

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become a truly global superpower. Originally, the rationale for U.S. rapprochement with China (beginning in the 1970s) was to balance against the Soviet Union. Now, the economic and diplomatic engagement of China is supposed to be a mechanism of socializing Beijing into becoming a status quo power. But full membership of the international economic order has set China on a path of extraordinary growth, laying the groundwork for the Chinese economy to become the largest in the world by the middle of this century. All of this means that although U.S. internationalism might have succeeded at containing the Soviet Union’s geopolitical influence and military ambitions during the Cold War, it has singularly failed as a strategy of facing down great-power rivals per se. On the contrary, the United States has deliberately put in place the conditions for its post–Cold War competitors to survive and even thrive.

From the view of liberal internationalists, the erosion of U.S. relative power is nothing to be alarmed at—and, in fact, it is easy to justify. While the United States might lose coercive capacity with the rise in power of other nations, the trade-off is well worth it when judged against the legitimate authority that comes with being a benevolent leader of the international system. And in any case, the panoply of international institutions that go together to comprise the U.S.-led world order will be robust enough to constrain rising powers and shape their fundamental interests: China and other emerging powers will face overwhelming incentives to preserve the international status quo and refrain from pursuing revisionist foreign policies inimical to U.S. interests.59

Trump rejects this liberal worldview. He cannot abide U.S. relative decline. Whereas liberals view relative decline as an acceptable price to pay for long-term international stability, Trump works from a different calculus. He abjures global leadership and places little stock in the capacity of international institutions to keep America safe. Trump does not even seem to chart U.S. foreign policy with a focus on absolute gains; instead, he views international politics (especially trade but also alliance politics)60 as a set of zero-sum interactions in which the objective is to outdo friends and adversaries alike. From this perspective, the United States should have used its preponderant power to maintain dominance over its potential rivals instead of building a multilateral international architecture in which others had a sizable stake. In other words, the United States

60Norrlof, “Hegemony and Inequality.”
should have acted more like a “coercive hegemon” than a benevolent leader.\textsuperscript{61} It is this outlook that leads Trump to blame the WTO for China’s economic rise vis-à-vis the United States\textsuperscript{62} and to condemn the decisions made by past U.S. leaders to heavily subsidize the defense of Germany, Japan, South Korea, and other economic competitors. Where liberal internationalists see magnanimity, far-sightedness, and enlightened self-interest in the modern history of U.S. foreign policy, Trump sees only the unnecessary emergence and strengthening of America’s nearest competitors—an analysis made clear in his administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy documents, both of which documents explicitly frame twenty-first-century geopolitics in terms of great-power competition.\textsuperscript{63}

For Trump, making America “safe again” means bolstering America’s position as the world’s preponderant geopolitical force and marginalizing international institutions and multilateral agreements, which have too often benefited others as much as (or more than) they have the United States. As noted earlier, this uncompromising unilateralism is somewhat reminiscent of the George W. Bush administration, which also advocated working outside of multilateral institutions if national security objectives were at stake—the invasion of Iraq in 2003 being the most obvious case in point. Yet Bush and his closest advisers sincerely believed in the cause of promoting U.S. leadership of other countries, even if they doubted the legitimacy and effectiveness of some international laws and organizations.\textsuperscript{64} The same cannot be said of Trump. Whereas Bush considered it America’s responsibility to spread “universal values” such as freedom and democracy (by force if necessary), Trump sees no benefit in the United States occupying a leadership role, cares little for how other


governments organize their internal affairs, downplays the importance of human rights, and expresses outright admiration for authoritarian rulers.

In the final analysis, Trump is a primacist who cleaves to the Jacksonian belief that preponderant military power is something to be desired, even if he disagrees with liberal internationalists over how this power ought to be applied. Trump does not view leadership of the international system as necessary to safeguard U.S. national security, and he does not consider multilateral institutions as having made America safer or more prosperous. Taken in isolation, Trump’s privileging of primacy over international concord implies a set of changes to U.S. grand strategy that would be of historic significance if they were implemented: a rethink of America’s alliance commitments, withdrawn support for a range of international organizations, the relinquishment of responsibility for policing the global commons, and the adoption of a neomercantilist economic policy, to name just some. Yet while such moves would be antithetical to the liberal formulation of internationalism pursued since 1945, they would not be inconsistent with a strategy of international activism or deep overseas engagement per se, a point I will return to.

Economic Nationalism

It is not just vis-à-vis geopolitical competitors that President Trump views the liberal international order as having failed to serve U.S. interests. In the economic sphere, too, Trump blames the U.S.-led world system for a host of national afflictions. Trump’s assessment is that when faced with unprecedented opportunities to architect an international economic order of their choice, U.S. leaders decided to subsidize the defense of America’s economic competitors and underwrite an open world economy that gratuitously made domestic firms and workers vulnerable to outside

68 Norrlof, “Hegemony and Inequality.”
pressures. And while this globalized economic order might have benefited some segments of American society (and the U.S. economy overall), it has undeniably visited serious hardships upon others, especially members of the white working class in America’s postindustrial towns and cities. As a billionaire who has profited enormously from the economic status quo, Trump is an unlikely figure to articulate such a worm’s-eye view of globalization. But his opposition to free trade is long-standing. And in the 2016 election campaign, Trump succeeded at making several of these points into effective messages. As two analysts from the Brookings Institution put it, writing just days after Trump’s victory over Hillary Clinton,

[A] resistance to globalization was arguably the foremost policy theme in Trump’s election campaign. In the speech announcing his presidential bid, Trump railed against the United States’ existing trade agreements, threatened to slap taxes on U.S. companies investing overseas, and pledged to build a wall to keep out migrants, whom he accused of being rapists. Trump’s plan for his first 100 days in office reaffirms the centrality of this theme, with a commitment to renegotiate or withdraw from NAFTA, abandon support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), label China a currency manipulator, establish tariffs to discourage companies from off-shoring production and jobs, expel more than two million migrants, suspend immigration from terror-prone regions, and build the wall.

Trump continued these antiglobalization themes once in office. In his inaugural address, the president vowed to bring an end to the era of “American carnage,” drawing a direct connection between internationalist foreign policies and domestic decline:

For many decades, we’ve enriched foreign industry at the expense of American industry; subsidized the armies of other countries while allowing for the very sad depletion of our military; we’ve defended other nation’s borders while refusing to defend our own; and spent trillions of dollars overseas while America’s infrastructure has fallen into disrepair and decay.

In terms of actual policy, Trump has used the powers of the presidency to end U.S. participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, put the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership on hold, seek revisions to the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, and initiate or threaten trade wars with foreign countries (including U.S. allies) through the imposition of tariffs. Although unpopular with the electorate as a whole, Trump’s attacks on foreign trade have not been without their domestic backers, especially among Republican voters.73

Whether or not Trump’s protectionist policies prove to be popular over the course of his presidency, it is without question that his economic nationalism found receptive audiences during the 2016 election cycle—first among the Republican primary electorate and again in the general election. Indeed, Trump’s victory in November 2016 represented the first time since 1928 that a presidential candidate ran against U.S. economic internationalism and won. It is important not to overstate the potency of economic nationalism as a political brand, however. Research suggests that popular opposition to free trade can be difficult to convert into sustained political support at election time, even if anti-immigration sentiment has been easier to mobilize in the contemporary context.74 Perhaps tellingly, Trump did not enjoy the backing of a majority of Republican electors until very late in the primary season (with the exception of the Northern Mariana Islands on 15 March 2016, it took until 19 April for Trump to win a majority of the votes in any territorial or statewide contest during the primary season) and, during the general election campaign, he rarely pulled ahead of Hillary Clinton in national opinion polls. And it is significant that Trump lost the national popular vote by 46.1 percent to Clinton’s 48.2 percent. But presidential elections are about winning enough votes in the right places, and there is evidence to suggest that Trump’s economic populism (protectionism) was decisive in critical states such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan.75 Therefore, it is not unreasonable to conclude

that Trump’s foreign economic policy played an important role in his elevation to the White House.\textsuperscript{76}

But if Trump’s 2016 election campaign channeled the frustrations of millions of Americans, it also went beyond mere interest aggregation on trade to build a new head of steam in favor of more general revisions to U.S. foreign policy. Trump’s rhetorical gambit was to contrast the plight of ordinary workers with the supposedly unfair advantages being enjoyed by foreigners (and “globalists” inside the United States) because of internationalist policies. As Trump described them, the U.S.-led international system and the foreign policies designed to uphold that system were nothing short of grotesque: a military used not to defend the homeland but to protect allied countries more than capable of defending themselves; foreign wars that cost dearly in American lives but purchased little in terms of national security, even stoking hatred against the United States; the facilitation of an international economic order that enriched already wealthy Americans and their foreign counterparts while adversely affecting domestic workers; and the subsidization of foreign competitors at the expense of domestic manufacturers.

At base, this depiction of U.S. internationalism continues to form the core appeal of Trump’s nationalist and populist foreign policy: the sheer repugnance of Americans’ own tax dollars being used to bankroll an international architecture that inflicts economic harm, social decay, and humiliation upon the heartland. Why have leaders in Washington, DC, prioritized lofty foreign policy goals over the more immediate needs of their own citizens? Why not put national resources toward programs that more obviously benefit struggling Americans? A foreign policy “disconnect” between voters and politicians is well documented by scholars of U.S. politics,\textsuperscript{77} but Trump has capitalized on this sense of political betrayal more effectively than any politician in recent times.\textsuperscript{78} The idea of America First is appealing to those Americans whose prior support for economic internationalism was predicated on an implicit compact—now perceived to have been broken—that economic openness should ensure economic prosperity at home.\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{76} Salena Zito and Brad Todd, \textit{The Great Revolt: Inside the Populist Coalition Reshaping American Politics} (New York: Crown, 2018), chap. 11.
**America First as Military First**

Trump, then, is an unambiguous critic of the original (post-1945) justifications for U.S. internationalism: he does not believe in the multilateral application of U.S. power and influence abroad as a way to secure the homeland, and he does not believe that the United States stands to benefit from an open international economy. Historically, opponents of internationalism from Robert Taft to Rand Paul have coupled such criticisms as these with an argument for a curtailed military establishment. Trump, however, has always been a strong proponent of the U.S. military for as long as he has been a public figure. As Thomas Wright notes,

> In a lengthy interview with Playboy magazine in 1990, Trump was asked what would a President Trump’s foreign policy be like. He answered: “He would believe very strongly in extreme military strength. He wouldn’t trust anyone. He wouldn’t trust the Russians; he wouldn’t trust our allies; he’d have a huge military arsenal, perfect it, understand it.”  

As president, Trump has been as good as his word when it comes to privileging the military. He has asked for (and, in February 2018, received from Congress) large increases to military spending; threatened war with North Korea, even if he later embraced a diplomatic approach toward Pyongyang; made known his desire to hold spectacular military parades; promoted current and former generals to key White House roles; adopted a hawkish nuclear forces posture; ordered two sets of missile strikes against the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria; and authorized a surge of troops in Afghanistan, among other actions. In the words of Inderjeet Parmar, the president’s foreign policy might more accurately be described as “Military First” than “America First.”

As discussed earlier, support for militarism has become almost hard-wired into the U.S. political economy and political culture. But even judged in this context, Trump is exceptional in the degree to which he champions the military. Trump’s affection for the armed forces is perhaps because he relies upon his role as Commander in Chief for political legitimacy more than any other modern president. At the time of his election, Trump was a bona fide political outsider. Although he wore this mantle with pride, it came with significant drawbacks: Trump lacked respectability in

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80Wright, “Trump’s 19th Century Foreign Policy.”


Washington, his allies in Congress were few and far between, and there was no sizable cadre of America First supporters in the bureaucracy, think tank community, or mainstream press. Making matters worse for Trump, he lost the popular vote in the 2016 election, faced large-scale protests against his leadership at the time of his inauguration, and was mired in allegations of collusion with Russian state operatives. These factors combined to deprive the president of popular legitimacy, political capital, and the same pool of political talent that incoming presidents can usually expect to be able to draw from. One result was that Trump turned to current and former military officials to staff some high-profile positions in his cabinet: John Kelly (first as secretary of homeland security and then as White House chief of staff), James Mattis (secretary of defense), and Michael Flynn and H.R. McMaster (both national security adviser). With the notable exception of Flynn, these men were among the most respected (and influential) members of the administration during its first year in office.

Embracing militarism as a way to project political power, authority, and legitimacy is nothing new for American presidents. It is, in fact, yet another similarity between Trump and Bush, another president who came to office with his legitimacy in question and who benefited politically from the opportunity to style himself as a wartime president after September 11. But Bush was a former governor, the son of a U.S. president, and had the backing of his party; his political survival was never dependent upon an association with the military. In contrast, Trump is much more vulnerable to accusations of illegitimacy and, as a result, his role as Commander in Chief appears to be much more important to him.

It is already clear that Trump’s militarism cuts against meaningful retrenchment in foreign affairs, his first year in office alone having revealed an attachment to long-standing orthodoxies about the importance of international primacy and the efficacy of military force as a tool of statecraft. It took less than one week after Trump’s inauguration for the U.S. military to lose its first soldier in battle when a raid on suspected terrorists in Yemen went awry, and within a year, Trump’s administration had

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announced a surge of troops in Afghanistan and committed the military to an indefinite presence in Syria. In October 2017, the deaths of four U.S. soldiers in Niger put a spotlight on the apparent boundlessness of America’s overseas military operations. Revealingly, Trump responded to criticism of the Niger operation not by entertaining a rethink of overseas military deployments but by passing the buck to military officials, suggesting that he had authorized the military to exercise broad discretion in fighting terrorism: “These are great fighters; these are warriors. I gave them authority to do what’s right so that we win. That’s the authority they have. I want to win. And we’re going to win.”

Given that the Pentagon is unlikely to volunteer a meaningful reduction in the U.S. global military footprint, war fighting will remain an everyday reality under Trump’s leadership so long as the military is left to chart its own course. This is especially true given that contemporary war fighting has become less costly in domestic politics as the financing of wars has shifted from taxation to borrowing, meaning that the Pentagon faces few serious threats to its funding from members of Congress. And if America’s commitment to perpetual military deployments is to remain in place, so, too, will the imperative to retain an extensive network of military alliances and overseas bases and, in turn, the belief that defending “turbulent frontiers” requires a permanent offensive advantage in all places and at all times. The result will be the assumption of overseas military obligations just as expansive—if not more so—than those accepted by Trump’s immediate predecessors. It is here that Trump’s affinity with the Jacksonian tradition in U.S. foreign policy becomes so important: Jacksonians are committed to achieving military victory at all costs, but America’s contemporary wars cannot be won in a conventional sense, and so Trump is likely to find himself dedicated to waging endless

Indeed, Trump’s own defense spending plans seem to confirm that the president has no intention of retrenchment: his funding requests to Congress have envisaged the U.S. Navy expanding from around 280 to over 350 ships, the U.S. Air Force receiving over 125 “Super Hornet” fighter jets, the introduction of battlefield (“tactical”) nuclear weapons, and extra funding for U.S. troops in Eastern Europe (the “European Deterrence Initiative”)—items more to do with overseas power projection than strict national defense.

In short, the Trump White House has shown itself to be wedded to the goal of strengthening the global reach of the U.S. military and perfectly willing—at times, seemingly eager—to sanction the use of military force abroad. This is not to say that Trump cannot or will not institute important changes to U.S. foreign relations. On the contrary, the president has already had a perhaps indelible impact upon several aspects of U.S. diplomacy—his announcement to initiate a withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, the travel ban on citizens of several Muslim-majority countries, his conspicuous unwillingness to affirm support for NATO’s Article V, his professed desire to start trade wars with friends and adversaries alike, his undoing of the budding rapprochement with Iran, and his apparent willingness to sacrifice America’s security relationships in Northeast Asia in service of improved relations with North Korea, to name just some examples. The United States may never again recapture an international leadership role for itself, and the damage done to America’s ability to make credible commitments could be irreparable. It is even conceivable that Trump would attempt to initiate a withdrawal or drawdown of U.S. forces from allied countries.

But it would be wrong to conclude that these ruptures in U.S. foreign relations constitute a significant policy of retrenchment. The more likely outcome is that, overall, the United States will maintain—and maybe even increase—its overseas military presence on Trump’s watch. As Rebecca Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper put it, “While unilateralism can manifest as isolationism, in Trump’s case it is not: rather, America First implies a selective and unpredictable pattern of American global engagement, not a wholesale retrenchment from the world so much as a jolting abdication of

leadership."⁹¹ The result will be something similar to the Bush legacy: a worsening of America’s international reputation and the probable weakening of some U.S. alliances, but nothing approaching a retreat from global affairs. Instead, America’s expansive world role and prodigious geopolitical footprint will remain intact (and may well increase) for as long as President Trump hews to militaristic assumptions about national purpose. Trump will govern as an internationalist, just not a liberal internationalist in the traditional mold.⁹²

Before concluding, however, it is worth acknowledging that President Trump and his administration are challenging subjects to categorize with a high degree of confidence. Not least of all, this is because the president’s words often do not match his actions, which makes it difficult to make even descriptive inferences about the “real” Trump foreign policy. While Trump implemented some of his campaign pledges after becoming president, such as by terminating the nuclear deal with Iran, he has contradicted himself in other areas—for example, with regard to his military policies in the Middle East.⁹³ Adding to the confusion, Trump and his advisers sometimes offer incongruent statements of foreign policy, which makes it difficult to ascertain the president’s true beliefs and the definitive foreign policy stance of the United States.⁹⁴ Partly, this dissonance from within the Trump White House is attributable to an inexperienced president who lacks either the willingness or the ability to forge consensus among his advisers.⁹⁵ It may also be that Trump is still learning about key foreign policy questions, and that his attitudes should be expected to shift as he is persuaded to abandon campaign promises in favor of more conventional approaches.⁹⁶ And, of course, the erraticism of the Trump administration might simply be because President Trump is a person prone to

inconsistency and unpredictability. Yet while Trump has been demonstrably incoherent on some foreign policy issues, his commitment to U.S. military primacy stands out as a point of relative consistency, both in words and in deeds. Even Trump’s unexpected decision to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in June 2018—the most obvious indication that Trump is amenable to choosing a diplomatic approach over military solutions to pressing foreign policy problems—came on the heels of dramatic threats against Pyongyang.

CONCLUSION: MILITARY INTERNATIONALISM
From World War II through the Cold War and up until the present day, the broad contours of U.S. grand strategy have remained largely the same despite changing geopolitical circumstances and no matter who has occupied the White House or which party has controlled Congress: a large and forward-deployed military, the job of which is to protect the United States, its allies, and the global commons; stable alliances with like-minded nations in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere—the largest network of its kind ever assembled; faith in multilateral institutions as mechanisms to amplify U.S. influence and engender support for America’s global leadership; and robust support for the deepening and enlargement of an open world economy, including the generous provision of public goods. For over 70 years, this formulation of U.S. internationalism has been based upon three interrelated beliefs: that national security is best assured if the United States plays an active role in maintaining a favorable international order, that core economic interests would suffer if the country were to abdicate its leadership position in favor of a more isolationist foreign policy, and that a large military establishment is good for America.

As noted in the introduction, Trump came to office amid widespread anticipation that his election would force a national debate about America’s world role. To quote Wright again,

For the first time since World War II, Americans will be asked to give their view on the most fundamental question of U.S. foreign policy: Do they want a U.S.-led liberal order or not? Internationalists will have to explain all over again why the United States flourishes and benefits from a healthy international system. Taft and Lindbergh lost before, but it would be a mistake to underestimate the messenger this time.

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98 Wright, “Trump’s 19th Century Foreign Policy.”
For the most part, however, this debate has not materialized to the extent that Wright and others expected that it would—at least not among elected officials (scholars and other public intellectuals, on the other hand, have wasted no time in debating the future of U.S. grand strategy and the liberal international order). To be sure, Trump has forced issues such as protectionism and immigration onto the national agenda and has attracted some domestic criticism for his attacks on U.S. alliances and his denigration of other multilateral institutions. But despite his outward anti-internationalism, Trump remains wedded to militarist orthodoxies and, for this reason, shows no sign of initiating a meaningful strategy of retrenchment. If anything, Trump looks set to invest heavily in the maintenance of military primacy, even if he can be counted on to use military force impulsively and without the agreement of U.S. allies.

Far from bringing about the dismantlement of America’s role in the world, the Trump presidency has demonstrated just how unchallenged are certain domestic foundations of overseas engagement. In particular, Trump’s choices as president show that the reasons for U.S. internationalism have evolved since 1941—or, at least, that there has been a bifurcation of purpose. For some Americans, internationalism is still a strategy centered on collective security and an “open door” international economy. This is the liberal version of internationalism that elements of both political parties (“the Blob”) look to salvage. But for others, both in the political class and the country at large, an internationalist foreign policy is more about maintaining military primacy than stewarding the liberal international order. There are thus two types of internationalism in contemporary U.S. politics: the traditional variety of liberal internationalism of the sort pursued by presidents FDR through Obama and an emergent brand of what might be called “military internationalism,” which has existed beneath the cloak of liberal internationalism for some time but now can be identified as a unique and independent formulation of overseas

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engagement in its own right. Liberal internationalism and military internationalism differ in important ways, but there is considerable overlap between the two: both envisage an expansive global role for the U.S. military and entail the undertaking of wide-ranging defensive commitments. The implication is that an activist (war-fighting) foreign policy will endure under President Trump and his successors for as long as the country remains wedded to militarism, whether or not the nation’s leaders put U.S. power at the service of the liberal international order.

None of this is to recommend that liberal internationalists be complacent about the future of America’s global role. Pessimists may well be correct that Trump’s foreign and defense policies endanger the U.S.-led liberal order, jeopardize international stability and security, and imperil the open door international economy.\(^{101}\) To defend the particular vision of international relations that they view as being in America’s best interests, liberal internationalists will indeed, per Wright and others, need to fight back with a robust and compelling defense of what they stand for and why. Liberals will have to convince domestic audiences that international cooperation (not just military dominance) is still the best recipe for ensuring national security and strengthening national sovereignty, unite those groups who stand to gain from an interdependent world economy, and find policy solutions for people who believe that they have been made worse off as a result of globalization.\(^{102}\) Unless today’s liberal internationalists undertake such political spadework, the two original ideational justifications for U.S. internationalism will continue to crumble until they exist no more. And if that happens, all that will remain will be the atavistic impulse to project power abroad—for militaristic and illiberal ends (or no programmatic purpose at all) if not liberal ones. This is the future of U.S. foreign policy that Trump’s presidency offers a window into.


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