Volume 132 - Number 4 - Winter 2017–18
The Enduring Appeal and Danger of World Order Making by the U.S.: A Review Essay Ronald R. Krebs reviews Richard Haass’ new book, A World in Disarray , which makes the case for U.S. leadership in constructing a new legitimate world order. He argues that Haass’ vision is driven by nostalgia for a world that never existed and that it warrants caution: world-shaping ambitions have proven extremely costly.
Volume 132 - Number 4 - Winter 2017–18
The U.S. Nuclear Umbrella over South Korea: Nuclear Weapons and Extended Deterrence Terence Roehrig argues that military, strategic, and moral considerations make it unlikely that the United States would use nuclear weapons to defend South Korea. He claims that the U.S. nuclear umbrella has served as a political tool used to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to South Korea.
Volume 132 - Number 3 - Fall 2017
The Varieties of Collective Financial Statecraft: The BRICS and China Leslie Elliott Armijo examine the collective financial statecraft initiatives implemented by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), five emerging powers important internationally and in their respective regions. They argue that BRICS cooperation has been surprisingly successful thus far.
Volume 132 - Number 2 - Summer 2017
From De-Nazification of Germany to De-Baathification of Iraq AYSEGUL KESKIN ZEREN compares and contrasts the design and implementation processes undertaken by the United States during the de-Nazifcation of Germany and the de-Baathifcation of Iraq. She discusses the historical, political, cultural, and economic differences between Germany and Iraq and those between the Nazi and Baath regimes. She argues that de-Nazifcation was an inaccurate analogy for de-Baathifcation.
Volume 132 - Number 2 - Summer 2017
The President’s Daily Brief: Managing the Relationship between Intelligence and the Policymaker ADRIAN WOLFBERG examines the roles of intelligence officers who present the President’s Daily Brief to the nation’s most senior policymakers. He argues that these officers add to the political landscape by contextualizing meta-information, that is, information about information, that only they can acquire and convey. He concludes that PDB briefers operate as a parallel organization to the intelligence community.
Volume 131 - Number 4 - Winter 2016–17
Why Presidents Sometimes Do Not Use Intelligence Information Patrick S. Roberts and Robert P. Saldin identify reasons why presidents sometimes do not use intelligence information. They argue that presidents may opt for “opacity” so as not to act on intelligence information that could upset the global strategic balance or their foreign policy interests. They discuss this phenomenon using as a case study the alleged Israeli-South African nuclear test in 1979.
Volume 131 - Number 4 - Winter 2016–17
American Good Fortune and Misperception about the Outside World Paul R. Pillar assesses how Americans’ unusually favorable circumstances and experiences shape their perceptions of the rest of the world. He argues that as a result of these experiences, American have difficulty understanding the security and economic challenges facing other nations and overestimate how well those nations can create stable democracies.
Volume 131 - Number 3 - Fall 2016
The Causes and Effects of International Treaties
Volume 131 - Number 3 - Fall 2016
Decision Making in Using Assassinations in International Relations Warner R. Schilling and JONATHAN L. SCHILLING analyze how leaders weigh the costs and benefits of using assassination to advance their foreign policy interests. They conclude that the decision-making process is prone to bias, especially when dependent on the identity of the likely successor.
Volume 131 - Number 3 - Fall 2016
Intelligence and the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars Richard H. Immerman assesses the efforts of the U.S. intelligence community in Iraq and Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. He argues that policymakers are primarily culpable for the missteps in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and that intelligence played a larger role in efforts to terminate the wars than in decisions to engage in them.
