CIA's Strategic Intelligence in Iraq
Richard L. Russell examines the strengths and weaknesses of American intelligence during the Gulf War in gauging Iraqi political intentions and military capabilities. He finds that overall strategic intelligence served policy makers well, but that some shortcomings, particularly in human intelligence collection, need to be corrected if the United States is to successfully deal with Iraq in the post-September 11 world. The role of the CIA was diminished after the war, even though he finds that the CIA’s estimates were more accurate than those of the Defense establishment.
The Quest for Absolute Security: The Failed Relations Among U.S. Intelligence Agencies, Athan Theoharis Reviewed by Richard L. Russell
Changing Course: Ideas, Politics, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, Sarah E. Mendelson Reviewed by Richard L. Russell
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North Korea and the West
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CONTINUING ISSUES IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
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