How do federal courts systematically influence public policy? Douglas Rice presents a complex yet cogent theoretical framework that firmly situates federal courts in the inter-institutional agenda-setting environment. With few exceptions (for example, Roy Flemming, B. Dan Wood, and John Bohte’s 1999 article “Attention to Issues in a System of Separated Powers: The Macro-Dynamics of American Policy Agendas” in the Journal of Politics), the discussion of interbranch agenda setting usually centers on Congress and the president. However, Rice incorporates all levels of the federal courts into his investigation of the judiciary’s ability to capture the attention, and agenda space, of national policymakers. In addition to its theoretical contribution, Lighting the Way incorporates an impressive macro-level empirical analysis that links the policy agendas of all three branches to explore the presence of agenda-setting influences from (and within) federal courts.

Rice describes broad postures that federal courts may occupy. The “passive” view suggests that the judiciary works to settle and clarify legal questions that arise after Congress and the executive have acted. Therefore, the courts have minor influence over congressional and executive agendas, particularly given the constraints of the legal process.