When I first read the title of this book, I expected a full-throated argument about the need for Democrats to increase the number of justices, if provided the opportunity. In Pack the Court! Stephen M. Feldman certainly provides such an argument, but the book took a path I did not expect. Feldman's case for Supreme Court expansion is packaged—pun intended—within a thorough and convincing discussion of what he calls the “law-politics dynamic.” For Feldman, court scholars devote too much attention to exploring the alternative law-politics dichotomy, which is based on a “myth” that the justices, quoting Chief Justice John Roberts, “decide cases according to the Constitution and laws without fear or favor.” As Feldman writes, “law should never be understood as being separate and independent from politics, at least in Supreme Court decision-making” (p. 4). Indeed, much of the book is devoted to exploring this “law-politics dynamic” because opposition to court-packing is based on the widespread belief—promulgated by the justices—that the Supreme Court is a mere umpire calling balls and strikes. By convincing readers that this belief is far from reality, the potential, if the not necessity, of court-packing is closer at hand.

In making his case for the centrality of the &l