A prevailing assumption in the electoral violence literature is that politicians use or organize violence strategically. According to many theories, elite-orchestrated violence can work by intimidating opposition voters (coercion) or mobilizing supporters (persuasion). In Voter Backlash and Elite Misperception: The Logic of Violence in Electoral Competition, Steven Rosenzweig calls these assumptions into question, suggesting that the costs of using electoral violence may be far higher than conventional wisdom assumes. Rather than provide an electoral boost, violence may instead trigger a voter backlash.

Why, then, do politicians resort to violence? Rosenzweig's main argument is not that politicians are not strategic but that they underestimate the costs of using violence relative to the benefits, effectively “misperceiving” the costs of deploying violence. The book's two main questions are, thus: do elites misperceive the benefits of electoral violence, and if so, why? To explore these questions, Rosenzweig leverages impressive original research, gathered primarily from Kenya.

The first main empirical chapters (chapters 4 and 5) explore the question of whether, or to what extent, election violence produces electoral benefits that outweigh the costs. Rosenzweig begins by leveraging constituency-level data on violence and e