Why do states seek international scrutiny of domestic practices that violate international norms? Why do they seek international attention to precisely those areas associated with corruption, human rights, or good governance that might earn them significant international penalty? Valerie Freeland's new book explains why patronage states on the periphery are particularly likely to invite the global spotlight and attempt to conceal their norm-violating behaviors.

With three rich case studies, all of which attempted the concealing strategy to varying degrees of success, Freeland argues in her book that concealing is more likely to be a successful strategy for peripheral patronage states when two conditions are met: illegibility and asymmetrical interdependence. In essence, these conditions mean some states can use the gap between de facto state practices and the formal rules on the books to better mislead international actors. Additionally, international actors sometimes want to be misled, particularly when a specific state becomes an example of a success story. When powerful outside actors need the target state to be somewhat successful to justify their own actions globally, the target state gains leverage.

The Ugandan case Freeland presents is one of two demonstrating successful concealment of problematic regime behavior. In this case, it occurred