Dean Acheson and the Korean War
David S. McLellan analyzes why fundamentally cautious and calculating Secretary of State Dean Acheson agreed to permit the United Nations forces to undertake the unification of all Korea. He argues that Acheson misjudged the intentions of Peking and mistakenly shared the prevailing confidence that MacArthur could accomplish his mission and that Chinese intervention, if it did occur, could be contained within a buffer zone. He concludes that Acheson failed to keep Truman adequately informed of both the political and the military risks, which ultimately led the President to allow MacArthur to advance.
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Ukraine, Russia, and the West
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