Volume 135 - Number 1 - Summer 2020
Foreign Policy Dilemmas and Opportunities for a New Administration: An Opinion Piece
Robert Jervis speculates about the likely foreign policy that a Democratic administration will follow if its candidate wins in November. He argues that President Donald Trump will have left a difficult legacy and his successor will have to simultaneously rebuild trust and instructions while also utilizing the leverage that Trump has generated.
Volume 135 - Number 1 - Spring 2020
What “The Cult of the Irrelevant” Neglects (And Gets Right): A Review Essay
PAUL MUSGRAVE reviews Michael Desch’s recently published
The Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning Influence of Social Science on National Security which argues that political science’s emphasis on methodology has made it irrelevant to policymakers. Musgrave disagrees and argues that political scientists’ sophistication has made them more useful to policymakers but that the obstacles to research influencing policy lie on the demand side.
Volume 134 - Number 4 - Winter 2019–20
How Foreign Policy Shapes American National Identity
PAUL T. McCARTNEY discusses how foreign policy has shaped American national identity. He argues that American national identity has changed since the nation’s founding and that foreign policy contributed to this evolution.
Volume 134 - Number 4 - Winter 2019–20
Process Learning in Foreign Policy: From the Bay of Pigs to the Berlin Crisis
Rebecca Friedman Lissner introduces the concept of foreign policy “process learning” and applies it to a comparative case study of the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Berlin crisis in the first year of the Kennedy administration. She argues that under certain conditions leaders can and do learn from foreign policy failures.
Volume 134 - Number 3 - Fall 2019
American Grand Strategy and the Rise of Offensive Realism
Ionut Popescu outlines the principles of a new American grand strategy grounded in an offensive realist theoretical framework. He argues that offensive realism is better suited to the new era of geopolitical competition with China and Russia.
Volume 133 - Number 4 - Winter 2018-19
Why Trump Won’t Retrench: The Militarist Redoubt in American Foreign Policy
PETER HARRIS assesses the likelihood of a retrenchment in overseas commitments under President Donald J. Trump. He argues that the Trump administration may challenge aspects of the liberal international order, but is unlikely to retrench from America’s military commitments abroad.
Volume 133 - Number 3 - Fall 2018
America First? Explaining Continuity and Change in Trump’s Foreign Policy
Paul K. MacDonald examines shifts in American foreign policy during the first year of Donald Trump’s presidency. He finds that Trump has not disrupted American foreign policy as dramatically as he promised, and that his choices appear driven more by domestic and bureaucratic politics than an overarching vision.
Volume 133 - Number 1 - Spring 2018
The Mayaguez Crisis: Correcting 30 Years of Scholarship
CHRISTOPHER LAMB evaluates scholarship on the 1975 Mayaguez crisis when the United States responded with military force to a Cambodian seizure of an American merchant ship. He argues that past scholarship has generated poor explanations of the U.S. reaction. According to the author, in responding to the crisis, the United States was focused on reinforcing credibility and, more importantly, on deterring North Korea.
Volume 132 - Number 1 - Spring 2017
Unequal Partners: U.S. Collaboration with China and India in Research and Development
Andrew B. Kennedy argues that the globalization of research and development has generated an interdependence among the United States, China, and India, but such that generally favors Washington. Nonetheless, several constraints make it difficult for the U.S. government to exploit this potential.
Volume 131 - Number 3 - Fall 2016
Intelligence and the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars
Richard H. Immerman assesses the efforts of the U.S. intelligence community in Iraq and Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. He argues that policymakers are primarily culpable for the missteps in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and that intelligence played a larger role in efforts to terminate the wars than in decisions to engage in them.