Volume 132 - Number 2 - Summer 2017
The President’s Daily Brief: Managing the Relationship between Intelligence and the Policymaker ADRIAN WOLFBERG examines the roles of intelligence officers who present the President’s Daily Brief to the nation’s most senior policymakers. He argues that these officers add to the political landscape by contextualizing meta-information, that is, information about information, that only they can acquire and convey. He concludes that PDB briefers operate as a parallel organization to the intelligence community.
Volume 131 - Number 4 - Winter 2016–17
Why Presidents Sometimes Do Not Use Intelligence Information Patrick S. Roberts and Robert P. Saldin identify reasons why presidents sometimes do not use intelligence information. They argue that presidents may opt for “opacity” so as not to act on intelligence information that could upset the global strategic balance or their foreign policy interests. They discuss this phenomenon using as a case study the alleged Israeli-South African nuclear test in 1979.
Volume 131 - Number 4 - Winter 2016–17
American Good Fortune and Misperception about the Outside World Paul R. Pillar assesses how Americans’ unusually favorable circumstances and experiences shape their perceptions of the rest of the world. He argues that as a result of these experiences, American have difficulty understanding the security and economic challenges facing other nations and overestimate how well those nations can create stable democracies.
Volume 131 - Number 3 - Fall 2016
The Causes and Effects of International Treaties
Volume 131 - Number 3 - Fall 2016
Decision Making in Using Assassinations in International Relations Warner R. Schilling and JONATHAN L. SCHILLING analyze how leaders weigh the costs and benefits of using assassination to advance their foreign policy interests. They conclude that the decision-making process is prone to bias, especially when dependent on the identity of the likely successor.
Volume 131 - Number 3 - Fall 2016
Intelligence and the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars Richard H. Immerman assesses the efforts of the U.S. intelligence community in Iraq and Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. He argues that policymakers are primarily culpable for the missteps in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and that intelligence played a larger role in efforts to terminate the wars than in decisions to engage in them.
Volume 131 - Number 1 - Spring 2016
Japanese Energy Policy after Fukushima Daiichi: Nuclear Ambivalence John S. Duffield discusses the evolution of Japanese energy policy since the tragic events at Fukushima Daiichi in March 2011. He finds that deep divisions over nuclear power have stymied the development of a new political consensus on the role it should play in addressing the country’s energy needs and concerns about climate change.
Volume 131 - Number 1 - Spring 2016
The Jihadist Returnee Threat: Just How Dangerous? Daniel Byman examines the terrorism threat that jihadist foreign fighters pose to the United States and Europe. He argues that the danger, while quite real, is at times exaggerated and that better policy can further reduce it.
Volume 130 - Number 4 - Winter 2015-16
Power and Risk in Foreign Policy: Understanding China’s Crisis Behavior Kai He discusses China’s foreign policy and responses to crises under former General Secretary Hu Jintao. He argues that when Chinese leaders perceive that their political survival is threatened they are more likely to exhibit risky behavior in terms of foreign policy. He discusses how these findings could inform our understanding of China’s current and future foreign policy orientation.
Volume 130 - Number 4 - Winter 2015-16
Did Chirac Say ‘Non ’? Revisiting UN Diplomacy on Iraq, 2002-03 Stefano Recchia revisits the George W. Bush administration’s attempt in the spring of 2003 to secure UN approval for the Iraq war. Drawing on new evidence from declassified documents and interviews with senior officials, he argues that the administration would have stood a good chance of securing UN approval—notwithstanding French opposition. But the administration had to be willing to postpone the start of military operations by up to six weeks and endorse a set of demanding benchmarks for Iraqi compliance, as proposed by Britain and several nonpermanent members of the Security Council.
