The Theoretical Foundations of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence
Robert Powell reconsiders the theoretical foundations of strategic nuclear deterrence. He identifies two theories of deterrence that rest on distinctly different sets of implicit assumptions and traces the implications of those different assumptions.
What in the Name of God is Strategic Superiority?, Barry M. Blechman and Robert Powell
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Developments in Beijing
Publishing since 1886, PSQ is the most widely read and accessible scholarly journal with distinguished contributors such as: Lisa Anderson, Robert A. Dahl, Samuel P. Huntington, Robert Jervis, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Theda Skocpol, Woodrow Wilsonview additional issues
CONTINUING ISSUES IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
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