Deciding on War Against Iraq: Institutional Failures
Louis Fisher analyzes the performance of U.S. political institutions in authorizing the war against Iraq in October 2002. He finds that the Bush administration failed to provide correct information to Congress to justify the war and relied on tenuous claims that were discredited on many occasions. He also argues that Congress failed in its institutional duties both by voting on the Iraq resolution without sufficient evidence and by drafting the legislation in such a way that it left the power to initiate war in the hands of the President, exactly what the Framers had tried to prevent.
The Discretionary President: The Promise and Peril of Executive Power, Benjamin Kleinerman Reviewed by Louis Fisher
A Culture of Deference: Congress, the President, and the Course of the U.S.-Led Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, F. Ugboaja Ohaegbulam Reviewed by Louis Fisher
The State Secrets Privilege: Relying on Reynolds, Louis Fisher
Executive Orders and the Modern Presidency: Legislating from the Oval Office, Adam L. Warber Reviewed by Louis Fishermore by this author
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PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION AND DEMOCRACY
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