Two Faces of Intelligence Failure: September 11 and Iraq’s Missing WMD
Richard K. Betts compares the causes of the two biggest U.S. intelligence failures of recent times. In one case, warning was insufficient; in the other, excessive. In one case, the obstacles to success were less carelessness in professionals’ performance than inherent limitations in the warning function. In the other, error came from intelligence trying to be useful more than being strictly accurate.
From Cold War to Hot Peace: The Habit of American Force, Richard K. Betts
Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration, Desmond Ball Reviewed by Richard K. Betts
Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Gerard Smith Reviewed by Richard K. Bettsmore by this author
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Presidential Power and Impeachment
American Political Institutions after Watergate--A Discussion
DEMETRIOS CARALEY, CHARLES V. HAMILTON, ALPHEUS T. MASON, ROBERT A. McCAUGHEY, NELSON W. POLSBY, JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN, ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., GEORGE L. SHERRY, AND TOM WICKER
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THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: EXTENDING THE U.S. UMBRELLA AND INCREASING CHANCES OF WAR
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