Organizational Interest, Nuclear Weapons Scientists, and Nonproliferation
SHARON K. WEINER looks at two cooperative threat reduction programs between the United States and Russia that were aimed at the proliferation of nuclear weapons expertise. She concludes that the organizational interests of the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories—key actors in these programs—are responsible for early success but, in the long term, have led to concerns that have limited program effectiveness.
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Ukraine, Russia, and the West
Publishing since 1886, PSQ is the most widely read and accessible scholarly journal with distinguished contributors such as: Lisa Anderson, Robert A. Dahl, Samuel P. Huntington, Robert Jervis, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Theda Skocpol, Woodrow Wilsonview additional issues
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CHINA IN A WORLD OF GREAT POWER COMPETITION
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With neither an ideological nor a partisan bias, PSQ looks at facts and analyzes data objectively to help readers understand what is really going on in national and world affairs.