What Really Happened in Planning for Postwar Iraq?
Stephen Benedict Dyson challenges the argument that the U.S. government failed to conduct planning for the post-Saddam Iraq. He shows that a plan for governing the country jointly with Iraqi leaders was developed and endorsed by the George W. Bush administration. Yet this plan was not implemented as a result of the on-the-ground decisions of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, who formalized an occupation and began an extended period of direct rule.
George W. Bush, the Surge, and Presidential Leadership, Stephen Benedict Dyson
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The Powell Doctrine
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PERSPECTIVES ON PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1992–2020
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