Generals and Autocrats: How Coup-Proofing Predetermined the Military Elite’s Behavior in the Arab Spring
HICHAM BOU NASSIF analyzes the behavior of the military elite in Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia during the Arab Spring. He argues that the different reactions of the military elite to the call of autocrats for support remains one of the fundamental puzzles of the Arab Spring. He identiﬁes the factors that determined whether the military elite had a vested interest in the status quo and the capacity to defend it.
Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect, Reese Erlich Reviewed by HICHAM BOU NASSIF
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Presidential Power and Impeachment
American Political Institutions after Watergate--A Discussion
DEMETRIOS CARALEY, CHARLES V. HAMILTON, ALPHEUS T. MASON, ROBERT A. McCAUGHEY, NELSON W. POLSBY, JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN, ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., GEORGE L. SHERRY, AND TOM WICKER
Publishing since 1886, PSQ is the most widely read and accessible scholarly journal with distinguished contributors such as: Lisa Anderson, Robert A. Dahl, Samuel P. Huntington, Robert Jervis, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Theda Skocpol, Woodrow Wilsonview additional issues
Articles | Book reviews
THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: EXTENDING THE U.S. UMBRELLA AND INCREASING CHANCES OF WAR
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