Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has held power near continuously since the 1950s, despite being shockingly unpopular. In Dominance through Division: Group-Based Clientelism in Japan, Amy Catalinac offers a convincing explanation for that seemingly perverse persistence. Drawing on troves of primarily quantitative data, Catalinac asserts the potency of group-based, rather than individual-level, clientelism in securing the LDP's success. The key is that votes be tallied and resources delivered at the same level (here, municipalities). Moreover, a dominant-party candidate may be able to convince voters not only that central-government funding hinges on support but that a district-wide “tournament” is in effect: that rewards decrease exponentially beyond the top-ranked municipality, per LDP vote share. In a twist on “perverse accountability,” in other words, LDP politicians convince even voters who prefer another party's policies to compete for their favor. Both top-down electoral reform in 1994 and municipality mergers in the 2000s, as well as more organic urbanization, have reduced “tournament-possible” districts from over 90 percent initially; the LDP continues to benefit, nevertheless.

Catalinac's examination is useful not only in explaining the LDP's resilience despite factionalism, lack of