The Reassertion of Congressional Power: New Curbs on the President
Harvey G. Zeidenstein surveys the provisions legislated by Congress from 1972 to 1977 to restrict the freedom of action of presidents in foreign policy, military deployments, weapons procurement and sales, intelligence activities, and impoundment of funds. He shows how some of these provisions go beyond strengthening the influence of Congress in its traditional legislative role and extend to giving Congress vetoes over specific administrative acts.
The Tethered Presidency: Congressional Restraints on Executive Power, Thomas M. Franck Reviewed by Harvey G. Zeidenstein
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Presidential Power and Impeachment
American Political Institutions after Watergate--A Discussion
DEMETRIOS CARALEY, CHARLES V. HAMILTON, ALPHEUS T. MASON, ROBERT A. McCAUGHEY, NELSON W. POLSBY, JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN, ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., GEORGE L. SHERRY, AND TOM WICKER
Publishing since 1886, PSQ is the most widely read and accessible scholarly journal with distinguished contributors such as: Lisa Anderson, Robert A. Dahl, Samuel P. Huntington, Robert Jervis, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Theda Skocpol, Woodrow Wilsonview additional issues
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THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: EXTENDING THE U.S. UMBRELLA AND INCREASING CHANCES OF WAR
The Academy of Political Science, promotes objective, scholarly analyses of political, social, and economic issues. Through its conferences and publications APS provides analysis and insight into both domestic and foreign policy issues.
With neither an ideological nor a partisan bias, PSQ looks at facts and analyzes data objectively to help readers understand what is really going on in national and world affairs.