The Congressional Veto and Administrative Rulemaking
William West and Joseph Cooper focus on the congressional veto as a means of controlling administrative rulemaking. They contend that criticisms of the veto are based on faulty assumptions concerning the legislative and administrative process and that the veto, if structured properly, can have a salutary effect as an oversight device in many areas of administrative rulemaking.
Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking: The U.S. House of Representatives in the Postreform Era, Barbara Sinclair Reviewed by Joseph Cooper
The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective, Ronald M. Peters, Jr. Reviewed by Joseph Cooper
The Transformation of the U.S. Senate, Barbara Sinclair Reviewed by Joseph Cooper
Legislative Influence v. Presidential Dominance: Competing Models of Bureaucratic Control, William F. West and Joseph Cooper
Running in Place: Inside the Senate, James A. Miller ; The U.S. Senate: Paralysis or a Search for Consensus, George E. Reedy Reviewed by Joseph Coopermore by this author
Join the Academy of Political Science and automatically receive Political Science Quarterly.
Primaries and Conventions for 2020
Publishing since 1886, PSQ is the most widely read and accessible scholarly journal with distinguished contributors such as: Lisa Anderson, Robert A. Dahl, Samuel P. Huntington, Robert Jervis, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Theda Skocpol, Woodrow Wilsonview additional issues
Articles | Book reviews
THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: EXTENDING THE U.S. UMBRELLA AND INCREASING CHANCES OF WAR
The Academy of Political Science, promotes objective, scholarly analyses of political, social, and economic issues. Through its conferences and publications APS provides analysis and insight into both domestic and foreign policy issues.
With neither an ideological nor a partisan bias, PSQ looks at facts and analyzes data objectively to help readers understand what is really going on in national and world affairs.