Legislative Influence v. Presidential Dominance: Competing Models of Bureaucratic Control
William F. West and Joseph Cooper critically examine prescriptive theories of congressional and presidential oversight of the bureaucracy. They argue that the emergent model of executive hegemony is based on faulty empirical premises concerning institutional performance and faulty normative premises concerning institutional roles.
What Motivates Bureaucrats? Politics and Administration during the Reagan Years, Marissa Martino Golden Reviewed by William F. West
Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking: The U.S. House of Representatives in the Postreform Era, Barbara Sinclair Reviewed by Joseph Cooper
The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective, Ronald M. Peters, Jr. Reviewed by Joseph Cooper
The Transformation of the U.S. Senate, Barbara Sinclair Reviewed by Joseph Cooper
Presidential Influence and the Administrative State, Richard W. Waterman Reviewed by William F. Westmore by this author
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The Powell Doctrine
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PERSPECTIVES ON PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1992–2020
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