Volume 126 - Number 4 - Winter 2011-12
The Influence of Magna Carta in Limiting Executive Power in the War on Terror Eric T. Kasper examines the use of Magna Carta by U.S. federal courts in enemy combatant cases. He traces the history of due process, jury trial, and habeas corpus rights within Magna Carta as well as subsequent legal documents and rulings in England and America. He concludes that Magna Carta is properly used by the federal courts as persuasive authority to limit executive power in the war on terror.
Volume 126 - Number 2 - Summer 2011
The Challenges of Decreasing Oil Consumption STEVE A. YETIV AND ERIC S. FOWLER quantify the benefits for the United States of achieving hybrid-like efficiency in its vehicle fleet. They show not only how important such a move can be, but also that if Chinese consumers continue to buy inefficient vehicles at a fast pace, they will sap America's efficiency gains rather quickly. They argue that oil dependence is not only an American, but also a global problem that cannot be addressed seriously without multilateral cooperation.
Volume 126 - Number 2 - Summer 2011
Judicial Supremacy or Judicial Defense? The Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers Katy J. Harriger argues that the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection of the George W. Bush administration's policies on the trials of Guantanamo detainees should be understood within the context of separation-of-powers jurisprudence. During this time, the Court has asserted itself as the “referee” of the separation-of-powers system and has consistently defended judicial power, often at the expense of congressional and executive power.
Volume 126 - Number 1 - Spring 2011
Nuclear Forensics: False Hopes and Practical Realities Richard Weitz looks at the international politics of nuclear forensics—a scientific technique that employs various investigatory methods to reveal the source and history of nuclear material. He worries that many governments and analysts underestimate the difficulties in constructing an effective nuclear forensics regime that can pinpoint those responsible for a nuclear incident and thus weakens the ability to deter by threatening nuclear retaliation.
Volume 126 - Number 1 - Spring 2011
The Domestic Politics of Irrational Intelligence Oversight AMY B. ZEGART examines the roots of weak congressional intelligence oversight and challenges the view that ineffectual oversight stems from executive branch secrecy. Instead, she finds that Congress has tied its own hands by failing to consolidate its budgetary power or to develop robust expertise in intelligence.
Volume 125 - Number 2 - Summer 2010
Friends Don't Let Friends Proliferate Scott Helfstein examines the efficacy of economic sanctions as a tool to counter nuclear proliferation. He argues that contrary to conventional wisdom, international cooperation is not a key determinant in sanction success. Instead, empirical evidence shows that sanctions have been effective at altering nuclear policies only when the sanction sender and target have had friendly relations.
Volume 125 - Number 2 - Summer 2010
Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash Robert Jervis argues that friction between intelligence agencies and policymakers is an inevitable product of their conflicting missions and needs. Policymakers need political and psychological support, while intelligence generally raises doubts, points to problems, and notes uncertainties. Relations do not have to be as strained as they were under President George W. Bush, but they will always be difficult.
Volume 124 - Number 4 - Winter 2009-10
Organizational Interest, Nuclear Weapons Scientists, and Nonproliferation Sharon K. Weiner looks at two cooperative threat reduction programs between the United States and Russia that were aimed at the proliferation of nuclear weapons expertise. She concludes that the organizational interests of the U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories—key actors in these programs—are responsible for early success but, in the long term, have led to concerns that have limited program effectiveness.
Volume 124 - Number 3 - Fall 2009
Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure Uri Bar-Joseph and Jack S. Levy look at the different ways in which the conscious distortion of information and the politicization of intelligence can lead to intelligence failure. They apply their categories to the Soviet failure to anticipate the German attack in 1941 and to the Israeli failure to anticipate the Arab attack in 1973.
Volume 124 - Number 2 - Summer 2009
Freedom Fighters and Zealots: Al Qaeda in Historical Perspective Christopher J. Fettweis argues that too many post-September 11 analyses of terrorism seem to regard the phenomenon as brand new. Terrorism has existed throughout history, and its groups come in two forms: nationalist and ideological. This simple binary typology illuminates a number of important characteristics of terrorism, from group strategy and tactics to overall life expectancy. Perhaps most important, counter-terrorism measures that prove effective against groups in one category will often fail against those in the other.
